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Summary 
The private security and military industry has boomed since the early 1990s. Private security 
and military companies (hereinafter PSCs) perform a variety of tasks, some of which relate to 
activities regulated by international humanitarian law, human rights law and international 
criminal law. The purposes of this thesis are (1) to clarify the status of PSCs and their 
employees under international law, (2) to examine the existing possibilities to hold PSCs, 
their employees and states accountable for abuses of human rights and humanitarian law 
involving PSCs, and (3) to analyze the potential of various legal measures with at view to 
improving existing deficiencies. 
 
Most PSC employees are civilians according to international humanitarian law, which means 
they are not allowed to participate directly in combat. The involvement of PSCs in hostilities 
in conflict and post-conflict areas and in other precarious situations has raised a number of 
legal questions and has prompted the international community to take regulatory steps. 
Recent international initiatives include the Montreux Document on state responsibility in 
relation to PSCs, an international code of conduct and a draft UN convention. 
 
One central issue is how to ensure accountability for abuses of human rights or humanitarian 
law involving PSCs. Individual PSC employees may be held accountable for human rights 
abuses in accordance with international criminal law, and for violations of humanitarian law. 
It is unlikely that PSCs as entities can be held accountable under international law for 
violations of human rights or humanitarian law. State responsibility under international law 
normally requires that the harmful conduct can be attributed to the state. This is likely to be 
the case only with a state contracting the particular PSC. States may also under certain 
conditions bear responsibility for omitting to act on harmful conduct of a PSC. 
 
Individual PSC employees found guilty to a crime according to international criminal law are 
obliged to make reparation to victims. Since PSCs as entities cannot be held accountable 
under international law for violations of human rights or humanitarian law, they are not 
obliged to make reparations under this set of rules. States are obliged to make reparation for 
PSCs’ violations of human rights or of humanitarian law, if the violations are attributable to 
the state or if the state has failed to act in accordance with its due diligence obligations. 
However, it is uncertain whether individuals can claim personal reparation from states for 
violations of humanitarian law. 
Legal gaps in international law do exist with regard to PSCs, but there is no “vacuum of law”. 
The most pressing issues are to clarify how international law applies to these companies and 
to ensure accountability. The main causes behind the current lack of accountability for crimes 
involving PSCs are of a jurisdictional / procedural, economic or practical nature, coupled 
with a lack of political will. Gaps in material regulation exist mainly when it comes to 
holding companies as entities accountable, and with regard to crimes other than grave 
breaches of human rights and humanitarian law. There is need for a number of regulatory and 
other legal steps at both international and national levels. 
 
The PSC industry is exploring new fields of engagement, including peace support operations. 
The suitability of such a development is questioned. 
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Sammanfattning 
Den privata säkerhets- och militärbranschen (nedan PSC-branschen) har fått ett starkt 
uppsving sedan början av 1990-talet. Företag inom denna bransch utför ett antal tjänster, av 
vilka vissa berör aktiviteter som regleras av internationell humanitär rätt, mänskliga 
rättigheter och internationell straffrätt. Syftet med denna uppsats är (1) att klargöra vilken 
status företag och deras anställda inom säkerhets- och militärbranschen har enligt 
internationell rätt, (2) att undersöka existerande möjligheter att hålla företagen, deras 
anställda och stater ansvariga för kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter och humanitär rätt, 
samt (3) att analysera vilken potential olika rättsliga åtgärder har när det gäller att avhjälpa 
existerande brister ifråga om reglering och ansvarsutkrävande. 
 
Den stora majoriteten anställda inom PSC-branschen är civila enligt internationell humanitär 
rätt. Detta innebär att de inte har rätt att delta direkt i strid. Säkerhets- och militärföretags 
inblandning i stridshandlingar i konflikt- och post-konfliktområden och i andra vanskliga 
situationer har gett upphov till flera rättsliga frågeställningar och även föranlett nya 
internationella regleringar. Bland dessa initiativ märks särskilt Montreuxdokumentet rörande 
staters ansvar i förhållande till privata säkerhetsföretag, en internationell uppförandekod samt 
ett utkast till en FN-konvention. 
 
En central fråga är att säkerställa ansvarsutkrävande för sådana kränkningar av mänskliga 
rättigheter och humanitär rätt som involverar företag inom PSC-branschen. Enskilda anställda 
kan hållas ansvariga för kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter i enlighet med internationell 
straffrätt eller för kränkningar av internationell humanitär rätt. Det är däremot osannolikt att 
företag som sådana kan hållas ansvariga enligt internationell rätt för kränkningar av 
mänskliga rättigheter eller humanitär rätt. En stat bär normalt sett ansvar för en skadlig 
handling enligt internationell rätt endast om handlingen ifråga kan tillskrivas staten. Ifråga 
om säkerhets- och militärföretags handlingar är det sannolikt att sådant statsansvar 
uppkommer enbart för en stat som har kontrakterat företaget ifråga. Stater kan även, under 
vissa förutsättningar, bära ansvar för underlåtenhet att agera när privata subjekt, däribland 
företag, handlar på ett skadligt sätt. 
 
Enskilda anställda vid säkerhets- och militärföretag som falls för brott i enlighet med 
internationell straffrätt är skyldiga att kompensera brottsoffer. Eftersom företag som sådana 
inte kan hållas ansvariga enligt internationell rätt för kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter 
eller humanitär rätt är företag inte heller skyldiga att kompensera offer enligt nyss nämnda 
regler. En stat är skyldig att kompensera offer för ett företags kränkningar av mänskliga 
rättigheter eller humanitär rätt om kränkningarna kan tillskrivas staten eller om staten har 
underlåtit att agera med vederbörlig aktsamhet, i enlighet med principen om ”due diligence”. 
Det är dock osäkert om enskilda individer kan kräva personlig kompensation från en stat för 
kränkning av humanitärrättsliga regler. 
 
Det finns luckor i den internationella regleringen av säkerhets- och militärföretag, men det 
råder inte något rättsligt vakuum på området. De mest akuta behoven är att klargöra hur 
internationell rätt är tillämplig när det gäller dessa säkerhets- och militärföretags aktiviteter 
samt att säkerställa att ansvar kan utkrävas för rättighetskränkningar och brott mot 
internationell humanitär rätt. Huvudorsakerna till den nuvarande bristen på 
ansvarsutkrävande vid brott begångna av anställda vid säkerhets- och militärföretag i konflikt 
 5 
och post-konfliktområden är brister i staters utövande av jurisdiktion, samt omständigheter av 
ekonomisk eller praktisk natur, blandat med en brist på politisk vilja. 
 
Luckor i den materiella regleringen på internationell nivå existerar främst när det gäller att 
hålla företag som sådana ansvariga för kränkningar av internationell rätt, samt vad gäller 
ansvarsutkrävande för andra kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter och humanitär rätt än de 
grövsta internationella brotten. Sammantaget finns det behov av ett antal regleringar och 
andra rättsliga åtgärder på såväl internationell som nationell nivå. 
 
PSC-branschen utforskar nya aktivitetsområden, inklusive fredsstödjande insatser. 
Lämpligheten av sådant engagemang från företagens sida ifrågasätts i uppsatsen. 
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Preface 
“Frankly, I’d like to see the government get out of war altogether and leave the whole field to 
private industry.” 
(Major Milo Minderbinder in “CATCH-22” by Joseph Heller, 1955, p. 258, Simon & Schuster, reprint June 
1990). 
 
When putting, after a long process, the finishing touches to this thesis, my thoughts go to the 
people who have meant the most to me these past years: My mother, for putting up with me 
and staying beside me; my sister, who overtook me years ago…; my little ones, without 
whom all true meaning would be lost; my dearest friends Eleonor, Anna, Mia and Tanja – 
you have been there in good and bad and I appreciate you tremendously!; my cousin Jenny 
with family, with whom I have relived happy memories; et l’inspecteur Quijote, qui fait 
sourire le monde. 
 
And, of course, there would be no thesis without the insight, competence and support of my 
supervisor, who has shown the most remarkable patience… Thank you Radu! 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Subject and purpose 
Over the past fifteen years, a new category of armed non-state actors has stepped forward in 
the context of conflict situations and unstable states: the private security and military service 
industry. Although the rise of this industry significantly affects the handling of conflicts, 
including the waging of war, the legal side has not yet followed suit. Thus, the legal situation 
related to private security provision is at present unclear in several respects. 
 
The first aim of this study is to clarify the legal status of private security companies and their 
employees under international law. Thereafter the existing possibilities to hold these 
companies and their employees accountable for violations of international humanitarian law 
and human rights law will be explored. Is the assertion that “these [private military 
companies] act in a void, virtually free from legal constraints”1 correct? This issue is 
integrated with an analysis of the responsibilities of states for the actions of private security 
and military service firms and their employees. Finally, since the industry is still largely 
unregulated, the study will present some options for regulation, improved accountability and 
oversight. 
1.2 Methods and materials 
The intention with this study, as presented earlier, has led me to choose a combination of a 
descriptive and an analytical method. The study will begin with a short descriptive 
introduction to the private security and military service industry, in order to provide the 
reader with basic knowledge of the industry. Subsequent chapters are of a more analytical 
character. 
The materials used, including facts on the PSC industry, are collected mainly from articles 
and legal doctrine. The examination of state responsibility is based on the ILC Draft Articles 
on Responsibility of States and judicial decisions, taking into account recent international 
initiatives aiming at clarifying state responsibilities in relation to PSCs in particular (notably 
the so-called Montreux Document
2
). The chapter on possible future regulation will, beside 
legal articles and official reports, draw from recent regulatory initiatives, such as the just 
mentioned Montreux Document, the UN-based Draft of a possible Convention on Private 
                                                 
1
 Carney, Heather, Prosecuting the lawless: Human rights abuses and private military firms, George Washington 
Law Review, Vol. 74 (2006), p. 323. 
2
 The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to 
Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict, Montreux, 17 September 2008, 
last retrieved on 4 September 2011 at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf . The text of 
the Montreux Document is annexed to UN Doc. A/63/467 – S/2008/636, 6 October 2008 (Letter dated 2 
October 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations addressed to the 
Secretary-General). 
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Military and Security Companies
3
, and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security 
Service Providers
4
. 
1.3 Delimitations and structure 
I will start out in chapter 2 by describing the emergence and current scope of the private 
security and military service industry. 
Chapter 3 will be devoted to clarifying the legal status of PSCs and their employees under 
international law. There seems to be some confusion with regard to their status; governments 
generally refer to PSC employees as “civilian contractors”, thus implying that they are not 
perceived as combatants. At the same time, certain employees of PSCs involved in the Abu 
Ghraib incidents in Iraq have claimed combatant status in an attempt to avoid civilian law 
suits in the USA
5
. Certain representatives of the international community assert that more or 
less all PSCs are groupings of criminal mercenaries
6
, while many academic commentators 
have considered and rejected that view
7
. Since there are different ways of attributing PSC 
conduct to a state, depending on the legal status of the PSC and its employees under 
international law, the status issue must be determined before moving on to the issue of state 
responsibility and other issues of accountability. The status must also be clear and widely 
accepted in order for the international community and states to effectively regulate the PSC 
industry. Clarifying these companies’ and their employees’ status will establish what their 
employees are allowed to do in conflict situations. My examination will include the potential 
application of international laws on mercenaries, followed by a discussion on the status of 
PSC employees under international humanitarian law. 
                                                 
3
 Draft of a possible Convention on Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) for consideration and 
action by the Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/WG.10/1/2, 13 May 2011 (hereinafter Draft Convention 
on Private Military and Security Companies). 
4
 International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, Geneva, 9 November 2010. 
5
 The so-called “Taguba report” on the treatment of Abu Ghraib prisoners in Iraq (Major General Antonio M. 
Taguba, Article 15-6 investigation of the 800th military police brigade, 4 June 2004, available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/iraq/tagubarpt.html#ThR1.13, last retrieved on 5 May 2012). See also the 
US court cases Ibrahim et. al. v. Titan Corporation et al, United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia, Civil Action No. 04-1248 (JR), 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 12 August 2005; and Saleh et al v. Titan 
Corporation et al, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 05-1165 (JR), case 
361 F. Supp.2d. 1152 (2005), respectively Saleh et al v. Titan Corporation et al, United States District Court for 
the Southern District of California, Case No. 04 CV 1143 R (NLS). Updates on the cases’ current status can be 
found e.g. at the website of the NGO Center for Constitutional rights, http://ccrjustice.org/ . For more on these 
cases, see further below, chapter 4.6.2.4. 
6
 This was the view of the then UN Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries (more accurately the Special Rapporteur 
on use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to 
self-determination), Enrique B. Ballesteros, see e.g. his Report on the question of the use of mercenaries as a 
means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/1997/24, 20 February 1997 [hereinafter the UN Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries Report], paras. 
92-111, last retrieved on 20 September 2010 at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1997/e-cn-
4-1997-24.htm . 
7
 See e.g. Cameron, Lindsey, Private military companies: their status under international humanitarian law and 
its impact on their regulation, International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 88, Number 863, September 
2006, p. 577, last retrieved on 5 January 2011 at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_863_cameron.pdf ; Swiss Federal Council/Conseil fédéral suisse, 
Rapport du Conseil fédéral sur les entreprises de sécurité et les entreprises militaries privées, 2 December 2005, 
p. 45, last retrieved on 23 September 2010 at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/ff/2006/631.pdf ; cp. also with Zarate, 
Juan Carlos, The emergence of a new dog of war: Private international security companies, international law, 
and the new World Disorder, Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol. 34, 1998, p. 117 onwards. 
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Chapter 4 is focusing on the issue of accountability, largely based on the ILC Draft Articles 
on Responsibility of States together with the recent so-called Montreux Document (2008), 
which among other things clarifies state responsibilities in relation to PSCs in particular. 
After a short outline of relevant regulations, I will examine the responsibilities of states 
contracting or supporting PSCs (contracting states), of states on whose territory PSCs are 
based / incorporated (home states), of states on whose territory PSC activities are carried out 
(host states), and of third states. The chapter includes a number of judicial decisions 
illustrating instances where the conduct of private actors has been attributed to states under 
international law. The chapter also examines the possibilities of holding PSCs as entities and 
their employees as individuals accountable for violations of human rights and humanitarian 
law. I will refer to a selection of international and national legal instruments and national and 
international judicial decisions, and touch upon the issue of jurisdiction. 
 
Chapter 5 contains a final discussion and conclusions to be drawn from the foregoing 
analysis. The chapter glances forward and contemplates the “to be or not to be” of a new 
regulatory regime related to the PSC industry and which forms such a regime might or should 
take. It will also present some questions and issues, which might serve as “food for thought” 
and subject of further analyses. 
 
It is not within the scope of this thesis to discuss policy issues or the “to be or not to be” of 
the PSC industry. Nor will this thesis treat issues relating to the human rights of PSC 
employees in their capacity of workers. 
 
The 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq have fuelled the debate on the role, status, 
accountability and regulation of PSCs and their employees. Never before have states parties 
to a conflict relied as heavily on private security contractors as in Iraq and the situation in the 
country would most certainly be different had it not been for the presence of these companies. 
I have therefore, where relevant, chosen the example of Iraq to illustrate various situations 
and legal issues. 
 
A variety of terms are being used in the debate and in international legal instruments, to 
denote companies within the private security and military service industry: “private security 
companies”, “private military companies”, combinations of these two terms, “private security 
service providers”, “private military firms”, or simply “contractors” (the latter mainly used by 
the mainstream media). For the sake of simplicity, I will use the term private security 
company (abbreviated PSC) with regard to all companies within the private security and 
military service industry. 
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2 The private security and military 
service industry 
2.1 Current debate and recent international 
regulatory initiatives 
The initial debate on private security and military service companies was fuelled by two cases 
of corporate engagement in conflict areas: that of the South African company Executive 
Outcomes (EO) in Angola and Sierra Leone in 1995-1997 and that of Sandline International 
(registered in the Bahamas with offices in London and Washington, DC) in Sierra Leone in 
1997-1998. Contracted by national governments to provide direct military assistance and 
participate in combat against rebel forces, these companies were widely viewed more or less 
as mercenaries, albeit in new shapes
8
. Both Executive Outcomes and Sandline International 
have now dissolved. Although today’s PSCs are typically not hired by national governments 
to wage war or to participate in direct combat, some companies have been involved in 
dubious practices, such as assisting in coups d’état9. The US Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) is also known to hire private firms for engagement in its “war on drugs” in South 
America, firms that at times end up fighting the FARC in Colombia
10
. These cases represent 
the perhaps most controversial examples of PSC engagements. As we shall see, the PSC 
industry is multifaceted and complex, performing a variety of tasks globally, in many 
different situations and on behalf of a variety of contract partners, including states, 
international organisations, NGOs, humanitarian organisations and private companies. 
 
As was mentioned earlier, the debate on the role, status, accountability and regulation of 
PSCs and their employees was fuelled by the 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation of 
Iraq by US and coalition forces. Two incidents in particular led to reactions. First, the killing 
and subsequent mutilation of four employees of the private security company Blackwater 
Security Consulting (later renamed XE Services) in Fallujah in March 2004, followed by a 
US military assault on the city, drew attention to the relationship between the national 
military and security contractors and made many question the accuracy of calling them 
“civilian” contractors. Second, the involvement of employees of the private security company 
                                                 
8
 See e.g. Cilliers, Jakkie and Mason, Peggy (editors), Peace, profit or plunder? The Privatisation of security on 
war-torn African societies (South African Institute for Security Studies, ISS, Johannesburg, 1999), available at  . 
Its fifth chapter is entirely devoted to Executive Outcomes. See also Holmqvist, Caroline, Private Security 
Companies, The case for regulation, SIPRI Policy paper No. 9, SIPRI – Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, January 2005, last retrieved on 20 September 2010 at 
http://www.sipri.org/contents/conflict/SIPRI_PolicyPaper9.pdf , pp. 2-3, with further references. Executive 
Outcomes was primarily composed of South African special forces from the former apartheid regime and its 
human rights and humanitarian law record is questionable, see Singer, Peter W., Corporate Warriors: The rise of 
the Privatized Military Industry (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 2003), pp. 9- onwards. 
9
 Attention to this issue and calls for international regulation of such companies was renewed after the trial 
against Mark Thatcher for planning and organizing a coup in Equatorial Guinea in collaboration with a private 
military company, see Cameron, ibid. footnote 7, p. 577.  
10
 See the annual report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries, Enrique B. Ballesteros, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2004/15 (Question of the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the 
exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination), 24 December 2003, paras. 26 and 32, last retrieved on 20 
September 2010 at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G03/173/13/PDF/G0317313.pdf?OpenElement . 
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CACI International Inc. in the interrogation and torture of interns at the Abu Ghraib detention 
facility led to discussions about the qualifications of such contractors, as well as about their 
accountability for any human rights abuses they commit.
11
 
 
The use of armed civilians to carry out security tasks formerly performed by national 
militaries has raised a number of questions regarding transparency, accountability and legal 
issues. The apparent influence of the PSC industry, its involvement in highly dangerous 
activities, its access to an important logistical apparatus (including small arms and light 
weapons, as well as heavy war material, such as fighter airplanes, artillery and armoured 
tanks), and the creation of a situation of diffused responsibility and lack of accountability 
through contractual and insurance layers and shells have raised numerous concerns. 
Governments are obliged to uphold discipline within their armed forces. These forces are 
supposed to be held accountable through the political process, while individual soldiers, 
commanders and political decision-makers can be held criminally liable in domestic courts 
and the International Criminal Court (hereinafter the ICC). Like combatants, PSC employees 
may have the right to carry arms, they operate in areas of conflict, and they sometimes wear 
uniforms. Unlike combatants, however, PSC’s “chain of command” and control structures 
may be unclear. PSCs are subject to the terms of their contract, but as a rule not to any 
military legal disciplinary code
12
. In addition, they may be untrained in carrying out tasks in 
accordance with international humanitarian law. There is also a general lack of formal rules 
of engagement for PSCs employees
13
. As a result, the basic principles of accountability that 
are supposed to accompany governments’ control of violence are not functioning. 
 
                                                 
11
 Both incidents have been highlighted by the UN Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries, Ms Shaista Shameem, in 
her annual report (Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the 
right of peoples to self-determination), UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/14, 8 December 2004, para. 50, last retrieved on 
20 September 2010 at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G04/167/92/PDF/G0416792.pdf?OpenElement . For discussions on these two 
incidents, see e.g. Bina, Mark, Private military contractor liability and accountability after Abu Ghraib, John 
Marshall Law Review, Vol. 38 (2005), p. 1237; Carney, Heather, Prosecuting the lawless: Human rights abuses 
and private military firms, George Washington Law Review, Vol. 74 (2006), p. 317; Dickinson, Laura, 
Government for hire: Privatizing foreign affairs and the problem of accountability under international law, 
William and Mary Law Review, Vol 45 (2005), p.135. The two official US reports on the Abu Ghraib case (the 
Fay report and the Taguba report) both recommended referral to the US Department of Justice for potential 
criminal prosecution, see Major General George R. Fay, Article 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention 
Facility and 205
th
 Military Intelligence Brigade 130-34, 23 August 2004, available at 
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf , last retrieved on 5 May 2012. 
Incidents allegedly involving civilian contractors includes rape (Incident 22), use of “unauthorized stress 
positions” (Incident 24), use of dogs to aggress detainees (Incidents 25 and 30), and humiliation (Incident 33). 
For MG Fay’s findings regarding the investigated civilians, see the report, pp. 131-134. For the Taguba Report 
see above, footnote 5. 
12
 There are a couple of exceptions; in accordance with the FY 2007 Military Authorization Act, US military 
contractors operating in combat zones are subject to the US Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), provided 
that they are serving with or accompanying the US armed forces (UCMJ, article 2, para. a (10). Also the UK has 
legislation in place, according to which employees of British PSCs, when serving with the armed forces, are 
subject to the Service Discipline Acts and Service Regulations. 
13
 Some US-based PSCs performing security functions in Iraq have use-of-force rules in their contracts and train 
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Department of Defense, nor are they designed to reflect the levels of force used by the US armed forces; see 
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http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/issueareas/security/security_pdf/2005_Schreier_Caparini.pdf , last 
retrieved on 1 October 2010. 
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There are, as we shall see, clear indications that many PSCs are not competent to work in 
conflict areas and that this may result in human rights violations and violations of 
international humanitarian law. Moreover, since PSCs are accountable to shareholders rather 
than to voters, ways must be found to make PSCs contribute to the establishment of 
democratic and accountable security institutions. The capacity of individual states to manage 
the use of private companies in accordance with good governance may be challenged also in 
stable democracies. In institutionally weak or unstable states, it is all the more challenging. 
Recurring security incidents and human rights abuses involving PSCs suggest that, because 
of the highly specific and dangerous activities of many PSCs, self-regulation is not enough. 
 
The said concerns contributed to the creation, in 2005, of a working group under the then 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights (now the UN Human Rights Council). The 
mandate of the Working Group was to study, identify and monitor emerging issues, 
manifestations and trends regarding mercenaries and activities of private military and security 
companies and their impact on human rights, in particularly on the right of peoples to self-
determination (hereinafter the UN Working Group on mercenaries). The UN Working Group 
on mercenaries was also requested to elaborate and present concrete proposals on possible 
new standards, general guidelines or basic principles encouraging the further protection of 
human rights.
14
 Members of the UN Working Group on mercenaries and others have 
concluded that although norms of international humanitarian and human rights law apply in 
some situations involving PSCs, theses norms are rarely implemented in practice. In that 
sense, and in situations not covered by humanitarian law, in particular, there is said to be 
legal gaps in relation to PSC activities. It has also been pointed out that there is a lack of 
common standards for the registration and licensing of PSCs, as well as for the vetting and 
training of their staff and safekeeping of weapons.
15
 
 
The said concerns led the Swiss Government, together with the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (hereinafter the ICRC), to launch the so-called Swiss Initiative. In September 
2008 the Montreux Document was adopted by 17 governments
16
. The document, which is 
legally non-binding in itself, basically reiterates and clarifies existing international law 
relevant to state responsibility in relation to PSC activities. It also contains a number of good 
practices for governments and PSCs. Since its adoption, another 19 governments have 
expressed support for the document (May 2011).  
 
As a complementary instrument, an International Code of Conduct for Private Security 
Providers was signed by 58 companies in November 2010
17
. As of August 2011 a total of 166 
companies have signed the code. The code includes material rules on human rights and 
international law relevant to PSCs, rules on the incorporation of the code in company 
policies, and grievance mechanisms, among other topics. In short, companies signing the 
code pledge to restrain their use of force, respect human rights, vet and train their personnel 
and report breaches of the code. Perhaps most importantly, the code calls for the 
                                                 
14
 UN Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights resolution 2005/2: The use of mercenaries as a means of 
violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, 7 April 2005, 
E/CN.4/RES/2005/2, last retrieved 15 September 2011 at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45377c39c.html 
. 
15
 See e.g. del Prado, José L. Gómez (member of the UN Working Group on Mercenaries), Why private military 
and security companies should be regulated, 3 September 2010, available at the website of Business & Human 
Rights Resource Centre, http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Gomez-del-Prado-article-on-regulation-of-
private-and-military-firms-3-Sep-2010.pdf , last retrieved on 26 September 2011. 
16
 Ibid. footnote 2. 
17
 Ibid. footnote 4. 
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establishment of independent, external oversight and accountability mechanisms. For this 
purpose, a Steering Committee was set up in November 2010, with equal representation of 
companies, governments and civil society. Its task is to conduct consultations throughout 
2011, after which initial arrangements for the said mechanism is due to be in place in Spring 
2012. The mechanism is supposed to include both objective and measurable standards and 
institutions able to oversee their practical implementation.
18
 
 
Parallel to the Swiss Initiative, an open-ended working group under the auspices of the UN 
Human Rights Council has, in May 2011, presented the latest version of a Draft Convention 
on Private Military and Security Companies, building on earlier drafts elaborated by the 
above-mentioned UN Working Group on mercenaries
19
. The main aim of the convention is to 
establish a more homogenous standard for international PSCs, including a regime of 
licensing, regulation and oversight. In particular, the convention seeks to prevent any 
outsourcing or privatisation of tasks involving the use of force, in the first hand, but also of a 
number of other functions and tasks related to security and military activities. State 
delegations favouring a new convention argue that existing instruments for the regulation of 
PSCs, including the Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct, do not 
adequately address the complexity of the problems associated with PSC activities. State 
representatives point out that those instruments do not establish proper mechanisms for 
accountability and for effective remedies for victims. Also the need to establish proper 
jurisdiction has been pointed out as a reason behind the draft convention.
20
  
 
It should be noted that a majority of western states are not supporting the drafting of a new 
convention on the subject of PSCs. EU states, as well as the USA, voted against establishing 
the open-ended Working Group tasked with drafting the convention
21
. African and Latin 
American states are among those most favourable to a new convention. The EU and the USA 
instead favour self-regulation and clarification and implementation of existing international 
law relevant to PSCs, in line with the Swiss Initiative, including the Montreux Document and 
the International Code of Conduct. Delegations voting against the establishment of the open-
ended working group pointed out that a considerable amount of international law in fact 
already is applicable to the activities of PSCs and their relations with governments: 
international human rights law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law, 
and public international law on the use of force. Therefore, those delegations considered that 
the adoption of a new convention was premature and that further discussion was needed on 
the potential need for new regulations and, if so, which form such regulation should take. It 
was also pointed out that there is no state consensus on the material principles incorporated in 
the draft convention and that some principles seemingly run counter to existing legal 
principles or principles that are on the agenda of other fora, notably the International Law 
                                                 
18
 For more information on the International Code of Conduct and related documents, see e.g. the website of 
Business & Human Rights Resource Centre at http://www.business-humanrights.org . 
19
 For the May 2011 version of the Draft Convention, see ibid., footnote 3. For the earlier version, see UN Doc. 
A/HRC/15/25, Report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and 
impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, 2 July 2010, including a Draft of a possible 
Convention on Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) for consideration and action by the Human 
Rights Council. 
20
 Summary of the first session of the open-ended working group, UN Doc. A/HRC/WG.10/1/CRP.2, 5 August 
2011. 
21
 See the Human Rights Council resolution to establish the working group, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/15/26, 7 
October 2010. 
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Commission.
22
 I will return to the strengths and weaknesses of these three instruments in a 
later chapter. 
 
There are also other international initiatives relevant to PSCs, for example the 
recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to the Committee 
of Ministers to draw up a Council of Europe instrument regulating state – PSC relations and 
laying down minimum standards for PSC activities
23
. Reference may also be made to the 
more general “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework”, by UN Special Representative to the 
Secretary-General, John Ruggie
24
. 
2.2 History, emergence and current scope of the 
private security and military service industry 
The traditional concept of the modern nation state (according to sociologist Max Weber) 
implies that the state has monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Interestingly, historically 
this is an exception. In fact, up until the birth of the modern nation state, armies have been 
dependent on contracted forces. This was the case with ancient Chinese, Greek and Roman 
armies, as well as with Italian city states during the 13th century and onwards and most of the 
European armies during the Thirty years’ War (1618-48).25 Contractors have also been a part 
of American military tradition ever since the American Revolutionary War (1775-83)
26
 and 
the powerful private commercial societies in India and South-East Asia during the 16th 
century depended on their own, private military. While these private military organizations 
were quite exceptional, mercenarism
27
 was more widely spread up until the 20th century. 
2.2.1 Reasons behind the emergence of the industry 
A variety of reasons have been presented to explain the boom of the private security and 
military service industry since the early 1990s. Explanations are related to both demand-side 
and supply-side factors. Three dynamic forces are most commonly put forward: 
 
                                                 
22
 UN Doc. A/HRC/WG.10/1/CRP.2, 5 August 2011, ibid. footnote 20, in particular sections 41-43. 
23
 See the Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Documents No. 11787, 22 December 2008 (Report by 
the Political Affairs Committee), respectively No. 11801, 27 January 2009 (Opinion of the Committee on Legal 
Affairs and Human Rights), both on the subject ”Private military and security firms and the erosion of the state 
monopoly on the use of force”), last retrieved on 7 October 2011 at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc08/EDOC11787.htm, respectively at 
http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/workingdocs/doc09/edoc11801.htm . 
24
 See Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie (including Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ”Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework), 
UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011. 
25
 Singer, Peter W., Corporate Warriors, ibid. footnote 8, pp. 19- onwards. See also Shearer, David, Private 
armies and Military intervention, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 316, (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 1998). 
26
 Worden, Leon, Downsizing and outsourcing, we’ve sprung Pandora’s box, The Signal, 27 June 2004, last 
retrieved 23 September 2010 at http://www.scvhistory.com/scvhistory/signal/iraq/sg062704.htm . 
27
 There are several definitions of mercenaries and mercenarism, but traditionally a mercenary is a person who 
offers his or her services as a combatant, according to contract and against remuneration, to a foreign power; I 
will return to this issue below. 
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(A) The end of the Cold War brought about dramatic changes in international relations, 
socio-political and economic systems and in international law. Downsizing of regular armies 
throughout the world followed, making large numbers of trained military personnel available 
for recruitment. (B) At the same time, increasing global instability led to a need for more 
troops. The nature of warfare in the developing world changed and became more chaotic and 
less professional, involving warlords and the use of child soldiers, while Western powers 
became more reluctant to intervene. (C) Adding to the above the general trend toward 
privatization and outsourcing of government functions around the world opened up for 
private actors to move in and take over security and military tasks traditionally performed by 
the state.
28
 
 
Also the fact that militaries have grown increasingly reliant on advanced technology, often 
maintained and operated by private firms has been mentioned as an explanation
29
. The 
industry itself points to cost-effectiveness, fast reaction cycles and lack of will or ability of 
governments to send their own troops into peace operations as the main reasons for its 
growth30. 
2.2.2 Current scope of the industry 
How the term “private security contractor” (or other terms used) is defined affects how one 
counts the number of companies; for example, certain data refer to armed security personnel 
only, while other data include also unarmed personnel. This, together with the fact that 
numbers fluctuate, makes it difficult to gain accurate and current data as to the number of 
PSCs and their employees active worldwide. A majority of PSCs are based in the United 
States and the United Kingdom. South Africa and Australia are also home states to a large 
number of PSCs. At the same time, many PSCs operating in conflict and post-conflict areas, 
such as Iraq or Afghanistan, are local, and both international and local PSCs employ a 
significant number of local nationals, as opposed to foreigners. Taking the example of Iraq, 
as of December 2010, there were 100 PSCs registered and licensed (or in the process of 
renewing their license) with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. Of these, 72 were Iraqi companies 
and 28 foreign companies.
31
 Worldwide, according to earlier industry projections, revenues 
from the global international security market were estimated to be over $200 billion in 
2010
32
. 
 
Long before the start of the Iraqi conflict, the USA and other states used unarmed private 
contractors to carry out support functions in military operations, such as providing food and 
laundry services. When the private security industry boomed in the 1990s and established 
                                                 
28
 See e.g. Holmqvist, ibid., footnote 8; see also Singer, Peter W., Outsourcing war, Foreign Affairs, March-
April 2005, last retrieved on 23 September 2010 at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050301faessay84211/p-w-
singer/outsourcing-war.html . 
29
 Singer, Outsourcing war, ibid. This implies that firms selling armaments offer accompanying services such as 
maintenance or training in the use of weapons. 
30
 Bunker, Robert J., Combatants or Non-Combatants, Journal of International Peace Operations, International 
Peace Operations Association (IPOA), 1 July 2006, last retrieved at 
http://ipoaonline.org/journal/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=96&Itemid=28 on 10 April 2007. 
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 Data as of December 2010, provided by Lawrence Peter, Director, Private Security Company Association of 
Iraq, 3 January 2011, cited by Schwartz, Moshe, in The Department of Defense’s use of private security 
contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background, analysis, and options for Congress, Congressional Research 
Service, 13 May 2011, p. 3, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40835.pdf , last retrieved on 22 
May 2012. 
32
 Avant, Deborah, Privatizing military training, Washinton D.C., Foreign Policy in Focus, 12 October 2005, last 
retrieved on 22 September 2010 at http://www.fpif.org/reports/privatizing_military_training . 
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itself as a truly global industry its tasks changed character. For example, PSCs became 
involved, alongside the regular armed forces, in training military personnel in former 
Yugoslavia and in building camps for displaced persons during the Kosovo conflict. A large 
number of PSCs are currently active in Iraq and Afghanistan, although both the Iraqi and the 
Afghan governments have recently taken steps to reduce the number of PSCs operating on 
their territories. 
 
The conflict following the 2003 invasion of Iraq has been described as the first privatised war 
because of the heavy reliance of the USA and their coalition partners on private firms to 
supply a variety of security tasks. There is no conclusive information on the number of 
private security contractors active in Iraq, nor a comprehensive overview of past and current 
PSC activities in the country. The various estimates and numbers are not entirely comparable, 
since they do not always include the same categories of personnel. In April 2007 there were 
at least 40 000 private security guards, working for some 160 companies, according to the 
UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries
33
. A US congressional report estimated in 
June 2007 that 20 000 – 30 000 persons perform protective security functions for private 
firms under US government contracts
34
. Although most of the private security companies 
operating in Iraq at that time were from the USA or Great Britain, their personnel had (and 
still have) a multitude of nationalities, including many local nationals. Today, as was 
mentioned just above, a majority of firms are Iraqi. 
2.2.3 Tasks and activities 
Some commentators consider today’s PSCs to be a “corporate evolution of the age-old 
profession of mercenaries”, while others disagree, meaning that these companies are a 
modern means for states, organisations and private firms to manage security problems.
35
 At 
any rate, today’s PSCs, unlike traditional mercenaries, are corporate bodies offering a wide 
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 Dagens Nyheter, 4 April 2007, last retrieved on 22 September 2010 at 
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 Singer, Peter W., Outsourcing war (ibid., footnote 28). See also the UN Special Rapporteur on the Use of 
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Zarate, ibid. footnote 7, p. 117 onwards. I will return to this issue further below. 
 18 
range of services, including tasks related to external security (protecting borders) and internal 
security (maintaining order within borders). Although few contracts refer to direct 
participation in combat, private security firms offer three broad categories of external security 
support: operational (including combat operations and strategic planning), military advice 
and training, and logistical support (e.g. communication services and the housing of troops) 
and technical assistance (including arms procurement and maintenance). Services related to 
internal security include site security (armed and unarmed), crime prevention, and 
intelligence. When providing physical protection of staff and premises, PSCs may also offer 
risk analysis, staff security training and crisis management advice.
36
 
 
Private security companies often form part of larger corporate conglomerates, typically being 
subsidiaries to extractive and mining firms, aviation or other transportation companies, 
weapons and armaments producers, or firms specialising in communication, engineering or 
manufacturing
37
. This connection between mainstream and security industry has strengthened 
in recent years as more multinational companies move into the security sector
38
. A growing 
segment of the industry provides risk analysis combined with complete security solutions; 
other recent additions to the industry include interpretation and interrogation services
39
. 
 
PSCs are contracted by a diversity of clients; by governments in various parts of the world, 
by international organizations (including the United Nations), NGOs, humanitarian agencies, 
reconstruction firms, international media agents and multinational companies
40
, especially in 
the extraction industries
41
. 
2.2.4 Categorization of companies within the industry 
Several attempts have been made to categorize and subdivide private actors within the 
security service sector. One widely used distinction is made between private military 
companies (PMCs) and private security companies (PSCs). PMCs are described as companies 
offering offensive services, designed to have military impact, while PSCs refer to companies 
providing defensive services, intended to protect individuals and property. However, this 
categorization meets with two problems: First, activities that are perceived as “defensive” 
under certain circumstances may well have offensive repercussions. Second, these companies 
are typically flexible and speedy in accepting new tasks offered by situational demands and 
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business opportunities. Thus the “offensive-defensive” (or “active-passive”) distinction is 
often irrelevant and at worst misleading.
42
 Moreover, international humanitarian law does not 
distinguish between offensive and defensive attacks
43
. 
 
Another system of classification has been presented by Peter W. Singer
44
. He subdivides 
what he refers to as private military firms (PMFs), into three types of firms, depending on the 
relationship of their primary tasks to the “tip of the spear” in “battlespace”. Services closest 
to the front line of battle are also nearer the “tip of the spear”, giving the following 
categorization, where type (1) firms are closest to the “tip”: 
 
(1) military provider firms, which offer services at the front line of combat, such as 
implementation and command of forces 
(2) military consultant firms, which provide mainly training and advisory services 
(3) military support firms, which are contracted to carry out “non-lethal aid and 
assistance”, including mainly logistical services such as transports and the housing 
and feeding of troops.
45
 
 
Although Singer’s definition clearly is more useful than the simple categorization security – 
military or defensive – offensive, most companies defy also Singer’s categorization. In 
addition, corporate impact on human rights, humanitarian law or the security situation may be 
significant also for corporate activities carried out farther away from the front line of combat. 
It is therefore in most cases more relevant to refer to specific corporate activities, tasks or 
contracts, rather than the type of company. Still, as we shall see further below, PSC 
employees’ closeness to or even participation in combat may have immediate consequences 
on human rights and humanitarian law, making it relevant when analysing corporate impact 
or establishing norms. Along this line, Deborah Avant has suggested a categorization similar 
to Singer’s, but basing her version on contracts rather than type of company46. 
 
In recent international instruments, such as the above-mentioned Draft Convention on Private 
Military and Security Companies, the Montreux Document and the International Code of 
Conduct for Private Security Providers, an entirely functional approach is used when defining 
the firms to which the respective instrument applies.
47
 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, the distinction between military and security related tasks is not 
decisive. As I mentioned in the introduction, I will use the term private security companies 
(PSCs) to denote all companies within the security and military service industry and, where 
relevant, refer to specific tasks, functions or contracts. 
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3 Status of private security companies 
and their employees under 
international law 
3.1 Background and the prohibition of force 
Since public international law does not specifically regulate PSCs in conflict areas, one has to 
turn to more general rules of public international law, humanitarian law and human rights law 
in order to establish the status of PSCs and their employees under international law. 
 
According to international customary law, as reflected in article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, 
states “shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations.” The sole generally accepted exceptions are the 
right to individual or collective self-defence (article 51 of the UN Charter) or the use of force 
in accordance with a Security Council resolution (chapter VII of the UN Charter). In 1970, 
the UN General Assembly adopted the so-called Friendly Relations Declaration
48
, which, 
although it is not formally binding, is considered as one of the fundamental documents of the 
UN and for the interpretation of the UN Charter. The first principle of the declaration 
reiterates the above-mentioned article 2 (4) of the UN Charter. The Friendly Relations 
Declaration furthermore declares that ”every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or 
encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for 
incursion into the territory of another State.” This was the first time international law 
explicitly treated the subject of mercenarism. However, the declaration does not define the 
concepts of ”irregular forces” or ”armed bands”, nor have these terms been defined in 
subsequent UN documents. 
3.2 Mercenaries 
Employees of PSCs are at times referred to as “mercenaries”, a word which evokes strong, 
mostly negative, reactions. There is, fortunately, also a strictly legal definition of a 
mercenary. This sub-chapter will examine whether the concept of mercenarism is helpful for 
regulating PSCs. 
 
Mercenaries are dealt with in two international conventions, specifically aimed at eliminating 
them through the criminalization of mercenary activities: The International Convention 
against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries
49
 and the (then) 
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Organization of African Unity Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa
50
 
(hereinafter the mercenary conventions if not treated separately). Additionally, mercenaries 
are dealt with in international humanitarian law, namely in article 47 of the 1977 Protocol I 
additional to the Geneva Conventions
51
 (hereinafter Additional Protocol I), which has been 
ratified by a large number of states. 
 
The two mercenary conventions deploy a definition of mercenaries similar to that of article 
47 of Additional Protocol I, which reads: 
 
1. A mercenary shall not have the rights to be a combatant or a prisoner of war. 
 
2. A mercenary is any person who: 
a. is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; 
b. does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; 
c. is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, 
is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in 
excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces 
of that Party; 
d. is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party 
to the conflict; 
e. is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and 
f. has not been sent by a State which is not at Party to the conflict on official duty as a member 
of its armed forces. 
 
Although the definition of a mercenary is similar in the two mercenary conventions and in 
Additional Protocol I, the consequences of being designated a mercenary are different. In 
short, under the conventions – if states parties thereto have adopted implementing legislation 
– persons who fulfil the criteria for a mercenary may be prosecuted for the distinct crime of 
being just that. On the other hand, it is not a violation of international humanitarian law to be 
a mercenary and mercenarism as such does not entail international criminal responsibility. 
The only consequence under this set of rules is that mercenaries are denied the right to 
prisoner of war status if captured and combatant status during fighting
52
. A person who is 
defined as a mercenary under Additional Protocol I may consequently be punished under the 
national laws of the detaining power for having directly participated in hostilities, but he/she 
may be prosecuted for being a mercenary only if the capturing state also has legislation 
designating mercenarism as a separate crime. A further difference between the mercenary 
conventions and Additional Protocol I is that the mercenary status in the latter is relevant 
only in international armed conflicts (since combatant status and its privileges exist only in 
those conflicts), while the conventions are applicable also in non-international armed 
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 Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, Organization for African Unity, Libreville, 3 July 
1977, CM/817 (XXXIX), Annex II, Rev. 3 (entry into force 22 April 1985 (hereinafter the OAU/AU 
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 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I, with annexes, of 8 June 1977, hereinafter Additional Protocol I), 
entry into force 7 December 1978. 
52
 Even a mercenary – as are all persons – is under all circumstances entitled to the minimum protections set out 
in article 75 of Additional Protocol I (fundamental guarantees), see article 45 of Additional Protocol I. The right 
to these fundamental guarantees is recognised as customary international law. 
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conflicts. It is worth noting that it is not a crime under the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court to be a mercenary
53
. 
 
Although attempts have been made
54
, there can be no general conclusion that all PSC 
employees are mercenaries, either under the mercenary conventions or under international 
humanitarian law. The definition under both of these regimes requires that each case be 
determined individually. This is one of the main reasons why the mercenary conventions are 
inadequate to regulate and control the PSC industry as a whole. It is conceivable, however, 
that certain individuals employed by PSCs meet the criteria in the mercenary definition. 
3.2.1 Mercenaries in international humanitarian law 
As I mentioned earlier, the two mercenary conventions deploy a definition of mercenaries 
similar to that of article 47 of Additional Protocol I (see above, p. 28). We shall now examine 
that definition in more detail. 
 
When prisoner of war status is questioned, the detaining power, represented by a “competent 
tribunal”, determines whether a person falls within the definition of a mercenary and thus is 
excluded from combatant and prisoner of war status
55
. The consequences of being denied 
combatant status may be severe, for although it is no crime under international humanitarian 
law to be a mercenary, a person denied combatant status might be prosecuted merely for 
partaking directly in hostilities. In addition, he/she may be tried and convicted for acts of 
violence that would have been lawful had he/she been a combatant. Thus, if he/she has killed 
a combatant during hostilities he/she may be prosecuted and convicted for murder.
56
 This 
prospect may deter many from putting themselves into such a vulnerable position. 
 
Apart from the above, humanitarian law does not regulate this category of persons. In reality, 
the definition in article 47 has proven to be more or less “unworkable”, due to the six 
cumulative criteria that a person must fulfil in order to be deemed a mercenary
57
. 
Nevertheless, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has determined that this 
provision forms part of customary international law
58
. Below I shall examine whether and, if 
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 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (2187 UNTS 90), 17 July 1998 
(corrected by procès-verbaux of 10 November 1998, 12 July 1999, 30 November 1999, 8 May 2000, 17 January 
2001 and 16 January 2002), entry into force 1 July 2002. 
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 See the UN Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries in his annual report in UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/15, in particular 
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Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, 12 August 1949 (the third Geneva Convention), entry 
into force 21 October 1959. 
56
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 See e.g. Hampson, Françoise J., Mercenaries: Diagnosis before prescription, Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law, Vol. 22 (1991), pp. 3-38, especially pp. 14-16. 
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 Henckaerts, Jean-Marie, and Doswald-Beck, Louise, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. I, 
Rules, ICRC and Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, Rule 108. 
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so, how the definition is applicable to PSC employees, but first a glance at the two mercenary 
conventions. 
3.2.2 The mercenary conventions 
The discussions in international fora regarding mercenarism largely reflect post-colonial 
experiences. During decolonisation, many of the new or emerging states were threatened by 
mercenary activities. As a result, the two conventions on mercenarism aim, in the first hand, 
to eliminate mercenary activities threatening legitimate governments and their self-
governance, rather than to prevent human rights abuses. 
 
The definitions of a mercenary in the above-mentioned 1977 OAU/AU Convention and the 
1989 UN Convention on mercenarism are almost identical with that of article 47.2 of the 
Additional Protocol I
59
. 
 
The two mercenary conventions subsequently relate the elements of offences: Persons who 
meet the criteria of a mercenary and who in fact directly participate in hostilities commit an 
offence
60
. Under the UN Convention on Mercenarism, even the attempt of direct participation 
constitutes an offence. In addition, the UN Convention on Mercenarism qualifies as offences 
the recruitment, financing, training and use of mercenaries
61
, thus widening the circle of 
criminally liable persons to individuals who do not personally take part in the fighting. The 
UN Convention on Mercenarism also has a wider scope than Additional Protocol I in that it 
includes not only international armed conflicts, but any ”concerted act of violence aimed at 
… [o]verthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the constitutional order of a 
State; or … [u]ndermining the territorial integrity of a State”. Also the OAU/AU Convention 
on Mercenarism includes an additional definition of “mercenary”, intended to address acts 
aimed at the overthrow of a government
62
. Interestingly, the OAU/AU Convention on 
Mercenarism does not prohibit all use of mercenaries by states, for example not the use of 
mercenaries against dissident groups within the state territory. 
 
The UN Convention on Mercenarism entered into force in 2001 and has so far been ratified 
or acceded to by thirty-two states only
63
. None of the permanent member of the UN Security 
Council has ratified it, nor have many other leading states or states that have significant 
numbers of PSCs operating from or within their territory, and its effectiveness has been 
questioned
64
. The low number of ratifications and accessions also reflects the fact that the UN 
Convention on Mercenarism does not form part of customary international law. 
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 Article 1, para. 1 of the OAU/AU Convention on Mercenarism simply repeats article 47.2 of the Additional 
Protocol, while article 1, para. 1 of the UN Convention on Mercenarism leaves out provision 47.2(b), instead 
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3.2.3 Private security companies in Iraq and mercenarism 
To sum up, a mercenary is a person who participates in combat for personal gain without 
being a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict. Mercenaries may be authorized 
to fight by a party to the conflict, but their allegiance to that party is conditioned upon 
monetary payment rather than obedience and loyalty. Mercenaries are sometimes treated as 
“unlawful combatants” or “unprivileged belligerents” even though their employment is not, 
as we have seen above, strictly forbidden by international law. As discussed earlier, 
mercenaries do not qualify for prisoner of war status under the Geneva Convention relative to 
the treatment of prisoners of war, and those meeting the criteria for mercenaries in the 1977 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions are explicitly denied combatant status
65
. 
Since mercenaries are not entitled to combat immunity, they may be prosecuted and punished 
for their hostile actions, even if their acts would be lawful under the laws of war if carried out 
by a soldier. 
 
During the period in 2003 and beginning of 2004 when the conflict in Iraq undoubtedly could 
be classified as an international armed conflict according to international humanitarian law, 
certain individuals working for PSCs in Iraq may well have met the definition of a mercenary 
in article 47 of Additional Protocol I and in the two mercenary conventions. This presupposes 
that they were not US, coalition allies’ or Iraqi citizens and that they were hired to – and in 
fact did – take part in hostilities. 
 
Let us take the hypothetical example of a South African former special forces member 
employed by a PSC to provide personal protection for leaders of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (hereinafter the CPA). Examining the criteria in the definition one by one, we must 
first establish whether employment as a bodyguard may constitute recruitment “in order to 
fight”. Now, the phrase “to fight” is not, under international humanitarian law, synonymous 
with an offensive attack
66
. Consequently, a person hired to defend a (military) person, but 
who engages in defensive combat may fall under article 47.2(a)
67
. Our bodyguard may also 
meet the second criterion (article 47.2(b)); however, it is understood that, in order to meet this 
criterion, the individual must be recruited specifically to fight in one particular conflict, not as 
a general employee
68
. Besides the possibility that protecting a US or coalition partner 
commander may in itself constitute direct participation in hostilities, there have also been 
reports of heavy fighting involving PSCs. One such clash took place in Najaf in 2004, where 
PSC employees engaged with enemy fighters fired “thousands of rounds of ammunition” and 
had to call in one of the company’s own helicopters, which instead of evacuating the 
employees dropped more ammunition
69
. Another example is the attack, mentioned in the 
introduction, on four Blackwater Security Consulting (now renamed Blackwater Worldwide) 
contractors at Fallujah in March 2004 and the following US response causing the city severe 
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 Barstow, David, (Schmitt, Eric, Oppel Jr., Richard A. and Risen, James), The struggle for Iraq: The 
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damages.
70
 Drawing from these examples, it is clear that some PSC employees fulfil the 
second criterion (sub-para. (b)) of directly participating in hostilities. As for the third 
requirement (sub-para. (c)), persons hired as bodyguards for the US occupation commanders 
earned considerably more than a US private. Our South African bodyguard is not national of 
a Party to the Iraqi conflict, thus meeting the fourth criterion (sub-para. (d)). The fifth 
requirement (not being a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict) will be 
discussed more closely below; suffice it to say here that PSC employees are not members of 
the armed forces. The fulfilment of the sixth and final criterion meets no difficulty, since 
South Africa did not send their soldiers to Iraq on official duty. 
 
In the light of the above, it is possible that some PSC employees working in Iraq could meet 
the legal definition of a mercenary.
71
 Still, the complexity of the definition makes it an 
inefficient tool also in these cases. Furthermore, the mercenary definition is not applicable to 
the scores of Iraqi, US, UK and other coalition partner citizens employed by PSCs in Iraq. 
Finally, how do we define the majority of PSC employees that do not meet all the six criteria 
in the definition? 
3.2.4 Conclusions regarding international law on 
mercenarism and private security companies 
Neither article 47 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, nor the UN Friendly 
Relations Declaration (which reflects customary international law) prohibits mercenarism. 
The two international conventions on mercenaries are not intended to regulate corporate 
security or military activities in conflict situations, but rather to target activity aimed at the 
overthrow of legitimate governments or recognised liberation movements. Neither of the 
conventions are universally accepted documents. 
 
We can thus conclude that customary international law does not prohibit mercenarism. The 
two conventions on the subject are not applicable to the activities of PSCs as entities
72
 and 
although individual corporate employees taking direct part in hostilities may fall under the 
mercenary definitions, they are likely to be very few; the definitions of a mercenary used in 
these conventions are so restrictive that they are rarely applicable in practice, even for the 
relatively few states that are bound by the conventions. In the light of the above, it is fair to 
say that the existing mercenary regulations under international law are largely unhelpful for 
regulating the employees and activities of PSCs. 
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Now, in order to establish what PSC employees are allowed to do in conflict situations, as 
well as to determine potential state responsibilities for the conduct of PSCs, it is necessary to 
go beyond analysing whether or not PSC employees qualify as mercenaries and clarify their 
legal status. Their status is also decisive when considering how these companies are most 
effectively and properly regulated. Therefore, the next chapter is devoted to an analysis of the 
status of PSC employees under international law. 
3.3 Status of private security company employees 
under international humanitarian law 
This sub-chapter is intended to clarify the status of PSC employees under international 
humanitarian law. Under this set of rules, a person must be either a combatant or a civilian
73
. 
Only after establishing whether an individual PSC employee is a combatants or a civilian can 
one determine his or her legal rights and duties, as well as the responsibilities under 
international law of other actors, notably the PSC itself, its customer, and its home and host 
state. 
 
Status determination may be tricky and a large presence in a conflict situation of parties with 
an unclear status renders the situation more difficult from a legal and security, as well as 
military and humanitarian, point of view. This issue falls within the current debate on lawful 
and “unlawful” combatants and the determination of their status may well have consequences 
for the debate as a whole. 
 
Although most examples in this chapter will be taken from US-based PSCs operating in Iraq, 
most observations apply to PSCs based in so-called efficient states in general. 
3.3.1 Background 
The guiding principle of the US government in Iraq has been that as much as possible should 
be outsourced, with the exception of “core government” or “mission critical” functions, i.e. 
functions “directly related to war fighting”74. However, one might ask whether such a 
distinction between direct war fighting and post-war reconstruction is possible to uphold in 
chaotic post-war situations such as the one in Iraq. 
 
International law applicable in armed conflicts, particularly those parts regulating belligerent 
occupation and non-international armed conflicts, should be relevant in the case of Iraq (at 
least for conduct that occurred before the handing over of sovereignty to Iraqi authorities on 
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28 June 2004)
75
. However, many aspects concerning the status, rights and duties of armed 
contracted personnel operating under those circumstances are largely unclear
76
. 
3.3.2 Short notes on international humanitarian law 
International humanitarian law is the international law applicable in armed conflicts (ius in 
bello). Its main purpose is to prevent and minimise the suffering of victims of war and other 
negative effects of warfare. Among the principal sources of international humanitarian law 
are the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977
77
 (the 
so-called Geneva rules), the Hague Conventions of 1907
78
 and several conventions 
prohibiting or regulating the use of specific types of arms. The vast majority of states have 
ratified the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols are also in force for a large 
majority of states. Also the Hague conventions are generally recognised. In fact, important 
parts of international humanitarian law emanate from customary public international law. 
However, it is important to remember that the rules pertaining to international armed conflicts 
are far more numerous and detailed than the ones regulating internal armed conflicts, the 
latter being the more common type of conflict nowadays. 
 
One part of international humanitarian law regulates the treatment of persons present on the 
territory of one of the parties to a conflict (in particular civilians on occupied territory and 
prisoners-of-war), such as the prohibition of torture and inhumane treatment. In addition, 
humanitarian law regulates the methods of combat, prohibiting for example attacks on 
protected persons and objects, such as civilians and civilian property, and certain methods of 
warfare, such as perfidy. Moreover, humanitarian law prescribes that an attack on a military 
target is prohibited if expected damages on civilians and civilian property are 
disproportionate. Furthermore, certain types of arms, such as chemical and biological arms, 
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are prohibited. Finally, specific rules regulate the obligations of occupying forces in relation 
to occupied populations and the administration of occupied territory. 
3.3.3 International humanitarian law and the status of 
private security company employees 
International humanitarian law does not only regulate state activities, it also contains several 
rules that individuals, including civilians, are bound by. The perhaps best-known example is 
Common article 3 of the four Geneva conventions of 1949, according to which civilians and 
other persons hors de combat are to be treated humanely and not be subjected to torture or 
other inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment. This implies that all persons who take active 
part in an international or a national armed conflict, whether they are members of armed 
forces, spontaneously armed civilians or employees of private security or military firms, are 
obliged to respect certain minimum rules governing the conduct of war. 
 
There are three main reasons why it is essential to establish whether PSC employees are 
combatants or not: (1) in order to know whether they may lawfully participate directly in 
hostilities; (2) in order for enemy forces to know if PSC employees are legitimate military 
targets that can be lawfully attacked; and (3) – closely connected to the first reason – in order 
to know if PSC employees who do participate directly in hostilities may be prosecuted for 
doing so. 
 
The right to prisoner of war (and combatant) status is connected to membership either in the 
armed forces of a party to a conflict
79
, or in a militia or volunteer force that belongs to a party 
to the conflict, provided that the militia or volunteer force also fulfils certain additional 
criteria
80. Under international humanitarian law, “[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to 
a conflict … are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in 
hostilities.”81 The first step when determining the status of a PSC’s employees is thus to 
establish whether they are integrated into the armed forces of a party to the conflict in 
accordance with article 4A(1) of the Third Geneva Convention and article 43.1 of Additional 
Protocol I. Alternatively they might, as an entity, qualify as a militia under article 4A(2) of 
the same convention (they are less likely to be regarded a volunteer force, in particular 
considering their pecuniary rewards). Under article 4A(1) of the Third Geneva Convention 
(and article 43.1 of the Additional Protocol I) it must be established that the individual 
concerned is integrated into a state’s armed forces according to the laws of that state (this 
corresponds by the way inversely to the fifth criterion of the definition of a mercenary). 
Under article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention the entity as a whole must meet the 
defining criteria. 
3.3.3.1 Integration into the armed forces of a party to the conflict 
Since members of the armed forces of a party to a conflict are combatants and as such have 
the right to participate directly in hostilities, it must first be established whether PSC 
employees may be integrated into national armed forces in the sense of article 43 of 
Additional Protocol I  and article 4A(1) of the Geneva Convention III. 
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Article 43 of Additional Protocol I reads: 
 
1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and 
units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, 
even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse 
Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, 
shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict. 
 
2. Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and 
chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they 
have the right to participate directly in hostilities. 
 
3. Whenever a Party to a conflict incorporates a paramilitary or armed law enforcement agency 
into its armed forces it shall so notify the other Parties to the conflict. 
 
International humanitarian law does not regulate how individuals are registered or otherwise 
incorporated into national armed forces for the purpose of article 4A(1) of the Third Geneva 
Convention or of article 43 of Additional Protocol I – that is decided by national laws alone. 
 
The central requirement in article 43 of Additional Protocol I is that the group in question is 
”under a command responsible” to a Party to the conflict. It has been suggested that the 
contract between the state and the PSC could specify that the PSC is ”responsible” to the state 
within the meaning of article 43(1). It is doubtful, however, whether the terms of a contract 
alone suffice to bring the PSC under a command responsible to the state. The concept of 
being ”under a command responsible” implies more than belonging to a party to the conflict 
and exercising elements of governmental authority, even if that authority is sufficient to give 
rise to state responsibility. The concept of ”under a command” most likely requires the 
person or group to be included within the military chain of command of the state’s regular 
armed forces. 
 
Moreover, it is reasonable to conclude that a state must somehow enable itself to exercise 
jurisdiction over PSC employees in order to make them ”subject to an internal disciplinary 
system”, which is required under article 43(1). The current inability of many states to subject 
PSC employees to their criminal jurisdiction in theatre thus precludes the applicability of 
article 43. The United Kingdom, for example, has legislation in place allowing prosecution of 
civilians committing offences abroad, including trying them on location, but this jurisdiction 
is limited to civilians employed directly by the government
82
. 
 
Also in the light of article 43(3) of Additional Protocol I, it would be strange if a state could 
simply hire a PSC, thereby making it part of its armed forces. Article 43(3) prescribes that a 
state, which incorporates paramilitary forces or armed law enforcement agencies into its 
armed forces, is required to notify the other parties to the conflict of the incorporation. Thus, 
some form of official incorporation is required, making it clear to all parties to a conflict 
exactly who constitute each party’s armed forces. 
 
Opinions on the above matters vary among commentators, but many experts agree that a PSC 
may qualify as part of a state’s armed forces under article 43(1) and its employees as 
combatants under article 43(2). This is provided that the ”command” and ”disciplinary 
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system” requirements of article 43(1) and the possible ”incorporation” requirement of article 
43(3) are fulfilled.
83
 
 
It is finally worth noting that not only the wording, but also the drafting history of article 43 
opens up for the possibility of including PSCs in national armed forces. The Commentary to 
article 43(1) stresses that article 43 aimed at including among the armed forces all groups, 
which have some sort of factual link to the regular armed forces. This link exists if the 
independent force acts on behalf of a party to the conflict in some manner and if that party is 
responsible for the group’s operations.84 The purpose of article 43 was, among other things, 
to broaden and simplify the definition of ”armed forces” within the framework of 
international humanitarian law. Therefore, it might be argued that where a state hires a certain 
PSC to engage in an international armed conflict on the state’s behalf, and the PSC is 
”responsible to” that state in the above sense, this particular PSC should be considered a part 
of that state’s armed forces. This interpretation is in line with the functional approach taken 
by article 43, in the sense that whether or not a group forms part of the armed forces depends 
primarily on whether the group is fighting on behalf of a party to the conflict. Thus, although 
the existence of today’s PSC industry was hardly predicted in 1977, article 43 allows for this 
interpretation. However, in the end this will be decided by state practice. 
 
Whether or not an individual PSC employee is entitled to combatant or prisoner of war status 
depends on a number of things. First, the individual must be an employee of a PSC having a 
combatant role in the armed forces, not a PSC ”accompanying the armed forces” within the 
meaning of article 4A(4) of the Third Geneva Convention and article 50 of Additional 
Protocol I. Second, the PSC itself must be entitled to combatant status under article 43 of 
Additional Protocol I. For example, if a certain PSC employee complies with international 
humanitarian law, but the PSC as a group does not, the individual will not be entitled to 
combatant or prisoner of war status. Third, the individual employee must comply with the 
fundamental requirements relating to the principle of distinction, i.e. carry his or her weapons 
openly in accordance with article 44 (3) of Additional Protocol I. In this connection, it should 
be noted that where a PSC falls under article 43 by constituting the armed forces of a state, its 
employees may, as combatants, be lawfully targeted solely on the basis of being employees 
of that PSC. This means that also employees who are not involved in combat, e.g. drivers and 
kitchen staff, may be targeted at all times. 
 
It is finally worth mentioning that the rules on government agents with legal status as 
combatants must not be confused with the international rules on attribution of certain acts 
(performed e.g. by private contractors hired by a government) to states for the purpose of 
holding states internationally responsible
85
. Although it may be possible, in a specific case, to 
attribute the acts of a PSC employee to a state, that relationship alone between the employee 
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and the state, even though sufficient to establish state responsibility, is not enough to make 
the PSC employee part of the state’s armed forces. 
 
In conclusion, it is conceivable – but not very likely – that a PSC may qualify as (part of) a 
state’s armed forces under article 43(1) and its employees as combatants under article 43(2). 
Generally speaking, it would somewhat go against the whole idea of privatization and 
outsourcing if a considerable number of PSC employees were in fact considered to be 
incorporated into national armed forces. 
 
In the case of Iraq, states hiring PSCs have been rather eager to emphasize that PSC 
employees are civilians. In addition, a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) memorandum 
prescribed that PSC employees, in order to comply with the necessary vetting procedures, 
“must be willing to respect the law and all human rights and freedoms of all citizens of the 
country”86. This and other formulations in the said memorandum and in a CPA order on the 
status of the CPA, MNF-Iraq (Multi-National Forces – Iraq), certain missions and personnel 
in Iraq
87
 indicate that the USA did not consider PSC employees to be part of its armed forces. 
3.3.3.2 Membership in a militia or volunteer force 
Members of a group that is not integrated into the armed forces of a party to a conflict might 
nevertheless qualify for combatant (and prisoner-of-war) status, namely under article 4A(2) 
of the Geneva Convention III, which prescribes that the following persons also have the right 
to prisoner of war status: 
 
Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance 
movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory … provided 
that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following 
conditions: 
 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; 
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 
 
It is not within the scope of this thesis to examine this rather complex article in detail, but a 
few remarks might help clarifying the picture. To begin with, the provision includes only 
militias and other groups “belonging to a Party to the conflict” (opening sentence). 
Furthermore, the following four criteria must all be met by the group as a whole. This implies 
that each PSC must be analysed separately. Although there is nothing odd about that, a 
company-by-company analysis has the major disadvantage of reducing predictability. If it is 
more or less impossible for an opposing force to know which PSC employees are accurately 
counted among the combatants (thus being legitimate military objectives) and which are 
civilians and possibly protected persons (the killing of whom could constitute a grave breach 
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of the Geneva Conventions), the resulting uncertainty might discourage combatants to do 
their best to comply with humanitarian law. In this connection, one must remember that in 
Iraq, there are more than one hundred PSCs operating. Many of their employees may wear 
uniforms and look much like combatants under Article 4A(2), although they are in fact 
civilians. 
 
One might ask under which circumstances civilian contractors might fulfil all four 
requirements in the definition of article 4A(2). It has been argued that many contractors lack 
uniform and are unlikely to be subjected to a responsible command. The additional two 
requirements – that of being independent from the armed forces yet belonging to a party of 
the conflict – further diminishes the chances of PSCs qualifying as militias. The PSCs most 
likely to “belong” to the USA, because they carry out services directly for US forces, namely 
lack the necessary independence to be considered a separate militia remaining outside the 
armed forces. Those PSCs that are more independent, for example because they are sub-
contracted by a reconstruction agency, are on the other hand less likely to “belong” to a party 
to the conflict.
88
 These arguments seem to be well founded. 
 
Another commentator points out that whether these companies “belong” to a party to the 
conflict or not also depends on whether the affiliated government would accept responsibility 
for their actions
89
. The commentator further argues that when a state makes a conscious 
choice to engage non-military private sector personnel to carry out certain tasks, it seems less 
logical to qualify those persons as a paramilitary force for the purposes of Article 4A(2).
90
 
 
It is conceivable that some PSC employees would qualify as combatants under Article 4A(2), 
but the vast majority would not. Considering the multitude of PSCs operating in Iraq, 
however, and even though some PSCs distinguish themselves from local civilians through 
their clothing and general appearance, it would be very hard for an enemy to distinguish one 
PSC from another, whose employees do not fall under Article 4A(2) and whom it would be a 
crime to target directly. 
 
Also a teleological interpretation of Article 4A(2) militates against using the article to define 
PSC employees as combatants. The original purpose of the article was to allow partisans and 
members of resistance movements to be granted prisoner of war status
91
, thus giving them an 
incentive to comply with international humanitarian law. Comparing PSC employees with 
those resistance movements seems to run counter to that purpose; while the second world war 
partisans were comparable with the remnants of defeated armies or with groups seeking to 
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liberate occupied territory, modern PSC employees in Iraq are quite the opposite – security 
guards hired to protect the occupying powers. The fact that the definition of mercenaries, 
established during the 1970s and reiterated later on, intended to withdraw combatant status 
from similar private military forces indicates that the original purpose of article 4A(2) is still 
viable. Although international law is evolving and must adapt to new phenomena and 
circumstances, and although there is no obligation to limit the interpretation of article 4A(2) 
to its original purpose, that purpose still provides guidance as to the 
(in-)appropriateness and (in-)adequacy of applying it to today’s PSCs. 
 
In this connection, one might also argue that the fact that at least some PSC employees are 
among those individuals most likely to be designated as mercenaries militates against 
granting them combatant status under article 4A(2) (although PSCs could avoid this problem 
by hiring only nationals of parties to the conflict, since such nationals are automatically 
excluded from mercenary status). 
 
From the above we can conclude that the legal basis for including PSCs and their employees 
among combatants in Iraq and elsewhere is very limited. The prevailing ambiguity 
concerning the international legal status of PSCs and their employees is illustrated by the fact 
that governments involved in the Iraqi conflict, as well as members of the US Congress, are 
consulting their legal counsel in order to clarify the status issue
92
. Admittedly, it might be 
tempting to ascribe PSC employees combatant status – in particular because their obligations 
thereby would be clear and they might also have a greater incentive to comply with 
international humanitarian law. It has rightfully been asked ”whether the criteria for attaining 
lawful combatant status adequately reflect the nature of warfare and fully account for those 
who participate in it”93. Even so, it seems that too many factors – not least legal ones – speak 
against granting PSC employees combatant status. It is not likely that such an interpretation 
of the definition of a combatant will be accepted widely enough to be effective. 
 
As I have mentioned, a person must be either a combatant or a civilian according to 
international law. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is very clear in its 
conclusion that there is no such thing as “part-time combatants”, “quasi-combatants” or other 
terms sometimes used to denote individuals whose activities are related more or less directly 
with the war effort. A combatant retains his or her status throughout the duration of hostilities 
(or until he or she is permanently demobilized by the responsible command), regardless of 
whether or not he or she is in combat or for the time being armed.
94
 Similarly, the ICRC 
points out that an interpretation of article 43 of Additional Protocol I which would allow 
combatants to “demobilize” at any time, with the purpose of returning to civilian status and 
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then once again taking up their status as combatants as the situation changes or as military 
operations may require, would cancel any progress that article 43 has achieved. Neither may 
a person have the status of a combatant while he or she is in action, and the status of a 
civilian at other times.
95
 
 
Finally, it should be noted that civilian personnel accompanying armed forces in the field are 
generally entitled to treatment as prisoners-of-war if captured by an enemy state during an 
armed international conflict
96
, but they are nevertheless considered civilians (i.e. non-
combatants) who are not authorized to take part in the hostilities
97
. Article 51 (3) of 
Additional Protocol I prescribes that “civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this 
Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities". 
 
In conclusion, the vast majority of PSC employees do not fall within the definition of a 
combatant and consequently have the status of civilians throughout their service. It is now 
time to examine the consequences of this categorization. 
3.3.4 Private security company employees as civilians 
It is a basic principle of international humanitarian law that civilians are immune from attack, 
but may lose this right during such time as they participate directly in hostilities
98
. The ICRC 
has issued the following official statement on the relevance of international humanitarian law 
in the context of terrorism: "If civilians directly engage in hostilities, they are considered 
'unlawful' or 'unprivileged' combatants or belligerents (the treaties of humanitarian law do not 
expressly contain these terms). They may be prosecuted under the domestic law of the 
detaining state for such action"
99
. Even though the statement was issued in the context of the 
debate on the so-called “War on terror”, the principle is generally applicable. 
3.3.4.1 Direct participation in hostilities 
In the light of the above, it is clear that any direct participation of PSC employees in 
hostilities is a serious problem. What may first come to mind is perhaps to explicitly prohibit 
PSC employees from participating in hostilities. Looking closer, however, such a prohibition 
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would not be practically applicable, for several reasons. First, the concept of direct 
participation in hostilities is not clearly defined. Second, humanitarian law does not 
distinguish between offensive and defensive fighting
100
, making it meaningless to prescribe 
that PSC employees may only defend, not attack. There is not even a clear definition of what 
constitutes combat fighting. Third, a legal permission for PSC employees only to defend 
civilian objects meets with the problem that the character of an object as civilian or military 
may change according to the circumstances, thus potentially changing the role of a person 
guarding it. Let us take a closer look at these three issues. 
 
International humanitarian treaty law does not define the concept of direct participation in 
hostilities, nor does a clear interpretation emerge from state practice or international 
jurisprudence.
101
 The term “direct” participation necessarily implies a distinction from 
“indirect” participation. While any interpretation of this concept needs to be narrow enough 
to protect civilians and make a distinction meaningful, it also has to be broad enough to meet 
the legitimate need of armed forces to effectively respond to violence by non-combatants. 
Attempting to balance these opposing interests, the above-mentioned ICRC Commentary on 
Additional Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions defines direct participation in 
hostilities as ”acts of war which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to 
the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces”. In the case of civilians, their 
behaviour must constitute a direct and immediate military threat to the adversary to be 
deemed “direct participation in hostilities”.102 
 
However, this definition has been challenged by some scholars and, to a certain degree, by 
state practice in an attempt to enlarge the concept. It has been proposed, for example, that 
direct participation in hostilities should include not only actual acts of violence, but also acts 
aimed at protecting personnel, infrastructure or material. It has even been suggested that the 
decisive criterion should be whether the civilian post in question brings added value to the 
war effort.
103
 
 
There is little doubt that a civilian carrying out an attack would be directly participating in 
hostilities. The same applies to civilians preparing for, or returning from, combat. The criteria 
for when preparation begins and where return ends remain controversial, however. It is also a 
matter of debate whether and under which circumstances civilians who become involved in 
fighting automatically become a party to the armed conflict. The discussion has come up in 
the context of peace support personnel involved in fighting, e.g. when defending civilians 
under attack. According to one view, peace support personnel involved in fighting become a 
party to the conflict if the fighting is of a certain intensity and duration and the peace support 
forces actually seek to defeat or weaken a party to the conflict. According to another view, 
peace support forces become a party to the conflict where one party to the conflict chooses to 
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regard them as such, regardless of which action the peace support forces take.
104
 Other areas 
of controversy include the qualification of ambiguous situations that do not necessarily 
include the use of weapons, for example logistical support activities, intelligence and 
guarding activities
105
. Guarding military bases against attacks from the enemy party and 
gathering tactical military intelligence clearly count as direct participation in combat, 
however
106
. 
 
All in all, there is far from general agreement as to what constitutes direct participation in 
hostilities. Clearly, direct participation should not be understood so broadly as to include any 
act that could be construed as supporting a party to the conflict. In the words of the ICRC 
Commentary ”there should be a clear distinction between direct participation in hostilities 
and participation in the war effort”107. This is important to keep in mind when discussing 
PSCs; to consider all support activities of PSC employees as participation in hostilities would 
be inaccurate and would have consequences for the categorization and status of other 
civilians working in war-related industries. This view is supported by the fact that the Third 
Geneva Convention foresees civilians performing tasks such as supplying armed forces with 
food and shelter while retaining their status as civilians (article 4A(4)). Most commentators 
agree that the same applies to civilians working in industries supporting the overall war 
effort, for example munitions factories
108
. Consequently, support and logistics activities, such 
as catering or construction and maintenance of military bases, carried out by PSC employees 
and other civilians are not considered direct participation in hostilities. Sometimes, however, 
logistics personnel who are members of the armed forces are called in to support troops 
finding themselves in a tight battle
109
. It has been reported that, in Iraq, troops have been 
compelled to leave the guarding of the base in contested areas to kitchen staff, due to 
shortage of military personnel
110
. In similar situations, the civilians concerned (who may be 
PSC employees) may find themselves fighting for a legitimate military object, which is likely 
to mean that they participate directly in hostilities. Even though civilian logistics personnel 
under certain circumstances enjoy protection as prisoners-of-war, they are not allowed to 
participate in combat except in personal self-defence. 
 
Now to the second issue mentioned above – offensive respectively defensive fighting. The 
determination whether a person is participating or not in hostilities does not necessarily 
depend on whether he/she intended to do so. According to article 49.1 of Additional Protocol 
I, “’attacks’ means acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence”. 
The problems associated with the lack of distinction between offensive and defensive attacks 
can be illustrated by the example of PSC employees working as security guards. A private 
security guard firing at an attacker is directly participating in hostilities if the attacker is a 
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member of a party to the conflict. If, on the other hand, the attack is carried out by a common 
criminal for “ordinary” criminal reasons the firing back does not constitute direct 
participation in hostilities. However, it may not always be uncomplicated to decide whether 
this is the case, since occupying powers and states sometimes enact laws criminalizing 
resistance fighters. If a private security guard fights against a member of such an outlawed 
resistance group, the mere criminalization of that group does not mean that the security guard 
is participating in a police operation or is defending him- or herself against criminals rather 
than directly participating in hostilities. It is the nature of the operation combined with the 
status of the persons involved (or the capacity in which they fight) that is decisive. 
 
The third and final issue concerns military respectively civilian objects. An object can be 
military according to its nature, location, purpose or use
111
. A building normally used for 
civilian purposes may thus change status and become a military object, for example by being 
turned into housing for troops. The question is then whether a PSC employee guarding such a 
building as the building changes status thereby is a civilian unlawfully participating in 
hostilities. If the building is temporarily filled with combatants the PSC employee may even 
be unaware of its change in status. Furthermore, does the PSC employee cease to participate 
in hostilities if the status of the object changes back to being civilian? In my view, it is 
unreasonable to expect that these potentially fast changes in status be known and taken into 
account by all the parties to a conflict. Although the problem can be reduced through 
regulations specifying that PSCs must not be used to guard objects of a military nature or in 
the vicinity of combat zones, etc., regulations cannot eliminate this problem entirely. 
 
In addition to the above issues, contemporary conflicts have given rise to further challenges 
when it comes to defining and implementing the concept of “direct participation in 
hostilities”. The increased intermingling of civilian and military activities – as illustrated by 
the use of high-tech warfare and offensive information operations
112
, psychological and 
electronic warfare, the use of PSCs and the “fight against terrorism” – makes it difficult to 
determine who is directly participating in hostilities and which measures should be taken to 
protect those who are not participating. 
3.3.4.2 Consequences of civilians’direct participation in hostilities 
As was mentioned earlier, civilians are immune from attack according to international 
humanitarian law, but lose their right to such protection during such time as they participate 
directly in hostilities
113
. This principle remains uncontroversial. There are, however, related 
issues giving rise to controversy. One such delicate issue is to determine the exact duration of 
“direct participation”, another the question whether the loss of immunity should be treated in 
the same way in international respectively non-international armed conflicts. The legal 
regime applicable in case of capture or detention of civilians taking direct part in hostilities 
has also raised numerous questions
114
. Moreover, although it is not a violation of 
international humanitarian law for a civilian to fight for his or her country, civilians who do 
participate directly in hostilities may be prosecuted under domestic law for their acts, whether 
or not they have violated international humanitarian law. It is not clear, however, whether 
they may be prosecuted in domestic courts for the mere fact of directly participating in 
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hostilities or whether such participation must involve an act prohibited under national or 
international law
115
. 
 
It is conceivable that the protection of “ordinary” civilians may be indirectly affected by an 
increased use of PSC security guards, particularly since such use may have implications for 
the doctrine on human shields and their direct participation in hostilities. Since the issue of 
human shields may come up in connection with civilian employees being used to guard 
(potentially) military objects, it is appropriate to say a few words on the subject. The term 
“human shield” is a military and political term, not a legal one. It refers to the presence of 
civilians in or around military targets with the purpose of deterring an enemy from attacking. 
It also includes the situation where a party to a conflict intentionally positions its military 
assets amongst a civilian population or close to civilian facilities, such as hospitals or schools, 
hoping that the enemy will be reluctant to attack them. Finally the term may be used to 
describe civilians literally shielding combatants during attacks, by being forced to march in 
front of soldiers during human wave attacks. The use of human shields to protect military 
targets is considered a war crime under international law; according to the Fourth Geneva 
Convention “[t]he presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain points or 
areas immune from military operations.”116 
 
Since it is extremely difficult to determine whether individuals acting as human shields are 
doing so voluntarily, no distinction can be made between voluntary and involuntary human 
shields when applying humanitarian law. Accordingly, all civilians – even those being placed 
or placing themselves in front of a military object – must be treated as ordinary civilians 
protected from attack. Consequently, any potential injury to them must be taken into account 
when assessing the proportionality of an attack. Any widespread use of PSC security guards 
risk opening up for acceptance of a distinction between voluntary and involuntary human 
shields, thereby reducing the protection of civilians. 
 
Since PSC personnel have varied background and carry out a wide range of tasks, it is 
difficult to give one concise answer to questions related to their direct participation in 
hostilities or their role as human shields. Certain PSC employees do have combat roles, for 
example strategic planning and target selection, or even participation in combat, thus 
undoubtedly participating directly in hostilities. The majority, however, are engaged as 
guards. As we have seen above, guarding tasks fall into a grey area when it comes to 
assessing direct participation in combat. In some cases guarding duties might even 
correspond to the use of human shields
117
. At any rate, any civilian tasked to guard a military 
object could be said to be engaged in combat. 
 
Even persons who would normally reject a distinction between voluntary and involuntary 
human shields may be more willing to accept such a distinction with regard to PSC 
employees. It is true that PSC employees with guarding duties seem to stand somewhere 
between combatants and ordinary civilians, thus appearing more willing to participate in 
combat than the average civilian does. However, how does one distinguish a PSC guard from 
a civilian acting voluntary or involuntary as a human shield? Furthermore, if we hold that 
PSC employees guarding a military object are participating directly in hostilities, then 
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follows more easily the conclusion that at least voluntary human shields placing themselves 
in front of military objects also are directly participating, thereby losing the protection from 
attack. 
 
In this connection it is also important to note that a party to a conflict, who places private 
security guards in front of (a significant number of) military objectives, or even likely or 
possible military objectives, may be in violation of article 51.7 of Additional Protocol I
118
. 
 
National armed forces normally have clear mechanisms in place to implement and enforce 
discipline and compliance with international humanitarian law among their members. First, 
armed forces have chains of command with potentially severe consequences for those who do 
not follow orders. Second, states have legislation, such as the US Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ), allowing prosecution and conviction of enlisted personnel for violations of the law. 
The lack of comparable mechanisms for non-enlisted personnel, including PSC employees, 
implies a potential risk for the civilian population at the hands of PSC personnel. This is not 
saying that all PSC employees are more likely than regular soldiers to violate humanitarian 
law; many PSCs hire highly trained and skilled former military personnel who may have an 
excellent knowledge of humanitarian law. However, PSCs also make profits from hiring large 
numbers of individuals of mixed background who provide cheap labour and whose level of 
training and skill most likely is more limited. I will return to the issue of accountability. 
Suffice it to say here that, as of today, there are no clear and effective mechanisms for 
holding PSC employees accountable for violations of humanitarian law. In the absence of 
this, the willingness and ability of most PSCs to ensure that their employees comply with 
humanitarian law and human rights law must be questioned, especially in the light of abuses 
already exposed in Iraq and elsewhere
119
. At any rate, voluntary commitments alone from the 
PSC industry, or from single PSCs, are no guarantee for full and solid accountability of PSCs. 
 
Direct participation in hostilities of PSC employees also carries important consequences for 
the employees themselves. The consequence of a PSC employee who is a civilian and 
participates in hostilities is identical with that of being a mercenary: he or she may face 
prosecution and punishment within the criminal justice system
120
. Not having immunity if 
they do participate in hostilities may come as surprise for PSC employees, especially if they 
are employed by a registered company subject to a regulatory scheme and not considered 
mercenaries by the licensing state. 
 
An Instruction issued by the US Department of Defense shows that the US military is well 
aware of the above problems and issues. The aim of the Instruction is to regulate the activities 
of PSC employees and the Instruction contains detailed requirements for those likely to 
participate directly in hostilities.
121
 Although welcome, similar regulations cover only PSCs 
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hired by the military, while companies hired by other actors remain unregulated. In addition, 
as is often the case, the main challenge lies in the will and ability of both authorities and 
PSCs to implement the regulations. 
3.4 The potential for a special status for private 
security company employees 
Although there is no category of “quasi-combatants” under international law, it may be 
tempting to argue that some PSC employees are somehow combatants (at least those who 
may be classified as persons accompanying armed forces) and, as a result, are accorded 
prisoner of war status
122
. However, such persons are not classified as combatants and are not 
allowed to participate in combat. This is clear when reading Additional Protocol I, article 50, 
in conjunction with the Third Geneva Convention, article 4, since article 50 of Additional 
Protocol I defines civilians as those persons not included in article 4A(1), (2), (3), or (6) of 
the Third Geneva Convention. Consequently persons included in article 4A(4) of the Third 
Geneva Convention must be civilians. Since article 43 of Additional Protocol I prescribes that 
only combatants may participate in hostilities one must conclude that civilians accompanying 
armed forces may not thus participate. In addition, the ICRC Commentary on article 43 
clearly specifies that “[a]ll members of the armed forces are combatants, and only members 
of the armed forces are combatants. This should therefore dispense with the concept of 
“quasi-combatants”, which has sometimes been used on the basis of activities related more or 
less directly with the war effort.”123 
 
On a personal note, it is somewhat ironic that the United States, the largest employer of PSC 
employees with a record of partaking in hostilities, is also the state most vigorously opposing 
basic protection for those whom US authorities denominate “unlawful combatants” in another 
context. 
3.5 Conclusions regarding the legal status of 
private security company employees 
From the above one may draw the conclusion that very few PSC employees meet all the 
criteria in the complex definition of a mercenary. Therefore, in a clear majority of cases, 
international law on mercenarism will not be relevant for the regulation of PSC employees. In 
addition, very few PSC employees will fulfil the criteria to be classified as combatants. As a 
result, the vast majority of PSC employees have the status of civilians under international 
humanitarian law. 
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The international legal status of armed contractors remains one of the hardest problems to 
solve in the field of humanitarian law and its application to private actors. Short of rewriting 
the laws of war, it seems difficult to establish a clear and widely accepted status for these 
contractors. At any rate, it is doubtful whether the international community would accept (an 
extended) legal protection for armed contractors involved in military activity. The only 
realistic way forward is for governments to regulate, monitor and follow up on the actions of 
these contractors, thus ensuring necessary transparency and accountability. On an endnote, it 
is worth stressing that any regular participation in hostilities of PSC employees might 
compromise the ability of international humanitarian law to protect “ordinary” civilians. 
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4 Accountability 
4.1 Background 
As I mentioned in the introduction, some PSC activities, notably those involving the use of 
force and firearms, have many features in common with those of national armed forces. At 
the same time, PSCs lack chains of command, institutions and many other control structures 
used to uphold discipline and control within national armed forces. As a result, the basic 
principles of accountability that are supposed to accompany governments’ control of violence 
are not functioning. 
 
Transparency is more or less a prerequisite for ensuring accountability. In national armed 
forces, the chains of command and other control structures are known, thus providing 
transparency. The PSC industry, on the other hand, has a standard policy of secrecy. In areas 
of conflict, it is all the more difficult for outsiders to know how PSCs operate. 
 
Various proposals have been put forward as to how PSC activities should be regulated and 
accountability achieved. One suggestion has been to regulate PSCs by changing the definition 
of a mercenary
124
, another to adopt an international convention on private military and 
security companies, or on the transfer of military services (similar to the instruments 
regulating international transfer of military goods)
125
. Various forms of monitoring systems 
have also been suggested. So far, a convention drafted under the auspices of the UN Human 
Rights Council has been presented to governments and a code of conduct has been endorsed 
by a significant number of companies
126
. I will discuss these and other possible legal 
measures further in chapter 5. Before that, however, I will clarify the respective 
responsibilities of governments and PSCs and examine the existing legal means of holding 
PSCs accountable. I will also touch upon the issue of sub-contracting and of PSCs contracted 
by other commercial entities. 
 
As of today, the international community lacks the means to enforce international law 
without the help of states. The investigation and prosecution of crimes normally fall under the 
jurisdiction of the state in which the crime was committed. However, in weak or conflict-
prone states there may be no functioning authorities to carry out these tasks. In criminal cases 
involving PSC employees deployed in those states, one alternative is to refer the task to the 
PSC’s home state or to the home state of the suspected PSC employee. Referring jurisdiction 
to states other than the one where the crime was committed is unfortunately problematic. 
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Some states, like South Africa, have relevant laws, but lack the necessary means for 
enforcing them effectively. Other states have some useful legislation, but with significant 
gaps – in fact, most states lack laws regulating and defining the jurisdictions under which 
PSCs operate.
127
 Since PSC employees normally are civilians, they are not part of a military 
chain of command. It is therefore in many cases unclear how, when, where and by whom 
crimes committed by PSC employees abroad are to be investigated and prosecuted. It is even 
more difficult to answer how – if at all – a corporate entity can be held accountable. Beside 
material regulation, the issue of jurisdiction is therefore central. 
4.2 The importance of contracts 
Contract formation and content have direct bearing on legality, legal certainty, accountability 
and the rule of law. Once a state has privatised a certain task, a carefully written contract 
between the state and the private actor is central. It enables citizens to check whether the 
privatisation is within the bounds of the law and corresponds with relevant democratic 
decisions. It is also a tool for control and steering for the state as well as its citizens when 
either is discontent with the services provided by the private contractor. 
 
A problem related to the formation of PSC contracts is the use of so-called “umbrella 
contracts”, also known as ”infinite-delivery, infinite-quantity” (IDIQ) contracts. These 
contracts imply that a price is set in advance to cover an unspecified number and nature of 
tasks during the contract period
128
. One example of an IDIQ contract is the one awarded to 
Kellogg, Brown & Root in 1995 for operations in the Balkans. The work descriptions therein 
were very broad, giving the company the “freedom to use latest commercial practices and 
techniques to meet requirements successfully”129. This type of contract has been criticized for 
being particularly open to abuse and over-charging, lowering the level of transparency and 
rendering corporate accountability more difficult. One example is the critique against 
DynCorp’s performance under an IDIQ contract for the training and equipping of the new 
Iraqi police service. According to official US auditors, the performance was tainted by poor 
contract administration, unauthorised work performed by DynCorp and property and other 
costs unaccounted for
 130
. The unstable situation in Iraq has forced many companies to tackle 
far more dangerous situations than were initially envisaged. Since many PSCs are flexible 
and take on new tasks relatively fast, they can often meet these challenges. However, this 
often leads to an increased lack of control over the precise nature of PCS operations. Even 
though the basic terms are clear – whether or not contractors will carry arms, for instance – 
the initial mandates are often insufficiently detailed or not properly updated. Adding to this, 
the rules of engagement and PSC mandates are further blurred by the subjectivity of 
interpretation. 
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Unclear mandates have sometimes led to what is called private security “mission creep”. 
There are numerous reports from Iraq of trigger-happiness on the part of security contractors 
originally employed for “defensive” guarding tasks. Furthermore, there have been allegations 
that some PSCs claim powers to detain people, erect checkpoints without further 
authorisation and confiscate identity cards.
131
 One example of companies performing tasks 
beyond their mandate is the PSC DynCorp, hired by the US State Department to provide 1 
000 advisers to help organize Iraqi law enforcement and criminal justice systems. It was later 
revealed that four DynCorp employees had taken part in an Iraqi police raid against the home 
and offices of former exile leader Ahmed Chalabi in June 2004. The contractors had not only 
worn body armour and carried rifles, but were also effectively directing the raids – a task that 
went well beyond their official mandate.
132
 
 
It is perhaps unavoidable for PSCs operating in areas of great physical insecurity to have 
some measure of discretion in executing their tasks. Under these circumstances, contractors 
may well consider it justified to decide for themselves which action is required in order to 
fulfil their contract. Therefore, it may, at least occasionally, be somewhat unjustified to blame 
individual companies for acting beyond their mandates. Another example may illustrate the 
situation. A UK-based PSC, Hart Group Ltd., was contracted to provide protection for 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) staff in Iraq, a “passive” task according to the 
contract. The instructions were that company employees were to call on military support from 
regular coalition forces if they came under direct attack by Iraqi insurgents. The managing 
director of Hart Group testified that, on numerous occasions, such help was not forthcoming 
and company employees consequently had to hold positions for considerable periods of time, 
effectively engaging in strategically sensitive tasks.
133
 
 
Adding to the difficulties of oversight of the contracting process is the extent of 
subcontracting between PSCs. According to one estimate, the USA has awarded 
approximately 2 800 contracts in Iraq, but has very little influence over the subcontracting
134
. 
Of all the companies providing security services in Iraq only a handful are contracted directly 
by the US government
135
. An unknown number of companies operate under subcontracts 
with US contractors. Yet another unknown number of security personnel are recruited as 
“freelance consultants”136. Subcontracting is a problem per se, leading to further dispersal of 
authority in policy implementation and even less oversight and control for the original client. 
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4.3 General features of state responsibility 
As a rule, the international responsibility of a state may be invoked in relation to a conduct of 
an actor not belonging to the state apparatus only if the actor is carrying out the conduct 
under the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, the state
137
. This rule is based 
on the distinction between public and private actors. Now, this distinction is partially mooted 
by the positive obligation on states under international human rights law to accept 
responsibility not only for the acts of state organs, but also for omissions of these organs, 
where such omissions have resulted in an insufficient protection of individuals whose rights 
or freedoms have been violated by non-state actors. However, this latter principle has been 
recognized only in cases where the state exercises jurisdiction, meaning that the state 
exercises effective control. A state is not presumed to exercise such control outside its 
territory. Therefore, it is only under exceptional circumstances that the power of the state 
organs over persons or property located abroad will amount to the exercise of jurisdiction 
justifying an extension of the positive obligations derived from international human rights 
law binding upon that state.
138
 
 
Before discussing home state responsibilities, a company’s home state must be determined. 
There are at least three possible connections between company and state whereby the state 
might become “home” to the company, for the purpose of regulating the state’s human rights 
responsibilities: 
 
- incorporation (normally the physical presence of headquarters or directors)
139
 
- financing through export credits 
- registration on the national stock exchange 
 
If incorporation increasingly loses its traditional, territorial aspect, the two latter (and 
possibly other levers as well) may become increasingly important as points of control, 
creating a political responsibility on the home state to regulate those companies. 
                                                 
137
 Article 4 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of states for internationally 
wrongful acts (hereinafter the ILC Draft Articles), adopted by the International Law Commission on 9 August 
2001. Article 4 is inspired by the position of the International Court of Justice (hereinafter the ICJ) in the case 
Military and Paramilitary Activities against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 1986 ICJ 
Report, p. 14. The Draft Articles were adopted by the International Law Commission at its 53
rd
 session, in 2001, 
and published in the Commission’s yearly report to the UN General Assembly (A/56/10). The report also 
contains commentaries on the draft articles. The Draft Articles can be found in the Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, and was reproduced in the annex to General Assembly resolution 
56/83 of 12 December 2001, corrected by document A/56/49(Vol. I)/Corr.4. 
138
 De Schutter, Olivier, Extraterritorial jurisdiction as a tool for improving the human rights accountability of 
transnational corporations (report prepared for a seminar convened under the auspices of the Special 
Representative to the UN Secretary General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises, Brussels on 3-4 November 2006). The report is available at http://www.reports-and-
materials.org/Olivier-de-Schutter-report-for-SRSG-re-extraterritorial-jurisdiction-Dec-2006.pdf , last retrieved 
on 22 October 2010. 
139
 However, two jurisdictions in Canada no longer require such presence in order for incorporation to occur. 
For a further discussion on incorporation, see the Summary Report from Workshop on attributing corporate 
responsibility for human rights under international law, convened by the UN Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 17 
November 2006, p. 6, available at http://www.business-humanrights.org/Documents/Workshop-Corp-
Responsibility-under-Intl-Law-17-Nov-2006.pdf , last retrieved on 22 October 2010. 
 46 
4.4 National and international jurisdiction 
Since prosecuting offenders of international crimes forms part of state responsibility, I will 
make a few, short notes concerning jurisdiction. 
 
National courts traditionally base their competence on one or several of the following 
principles: 
 
- territorial principle (the crime was committed on the territory of the forum state) 
- active personality principle (the crime was committed by a citizen of the forum state) 
- passive personality principle (the victim of the crime is / was a citizen of the forum 
state) 
- universality principle (the most serious crimes against international law, for which a 
direct connection with the forum state is not required
140
) 
 
On several occasions during the past decades, states have failed to fulfil their obligation to 
prosecute and punish crimes against international humanitarian and human rights law. For 
this reason, the international community has instituted several ad hoc tribunals over the years 
(Tokyo, Nuremberg, the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda) and, most recently, 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
was adopted in 1998, providing the legal basis for establishing the first permanent, treaty 
based, international criminal court. The Rome Statute entered into force in 2002. The 
International Criminal Court is competent only if the crime in question was committed on the 
territory of one of the signatory states or by one of their citizens, or if a case is referred to it 
by the UN Security Council
141
. Moreover, the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction 
only with respect to the most serious international crimes, namely the crime of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression
142
. Furthermore, the 
jurisdiction of the court presupposes that all national means of prosecution have been 
exhausted
143
.  
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4.5 State responsibility for the actions of private 
security companies 
There are four conceivable bases for state responsibility for PSC actions in the field of human 
rights and humanitarian law: 
 
- state responsibility where the PSC’s conduct is attributable to the state 
- state responsibility based on the concept of due diligence under international human 
rights law, i.e. states’ responsibility to respect, protect and fulfil human rights 
- state responsibility based on an analogous due diligence concept under international 
humanitarian law 
- international responsibility where a PSC is hired to participate in peace support 
operations. Those operations may imply a shared responsibility between one or 
several states and international organisations. I will not analyse this particular 
situation further, due to my limited space. 
4.5.1 State responsibility where company conduct is 
attributable to the state 
An act or omission, which is contrary to international law and which can be attributed to a 
state, entails state responsibility. Rules governing state responsibility are found in the above-
mentioned International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts
144
 (hereinafter the ILC Draft Articles), many of which reflect 
international customary law. 
 
To begin with, state responsibility is a consequence of an internationally wrongful act 
committed by one of the state organs (ILC Draft Articles 1, 2 and 4). Furthermore, an 
internationally wrongful act committed by an individual, by a group of individuals or by a 
moral person, who are not state organs, is also attributed to the state if (1) its law authorises 
the persons in question to carry out tasks relative to the exercise of state sovereignty or (2) if 
the said persons act according to directives from or under the direction or control of that state. 
In addition, the act of a person or a group of persons is considered an act of state when the 
person or group of persons effectively assumes functions relating to the exercise of state 
sovereignty in the absence of or replacing official authorities in circumstances that necessitate 
such functions to be secured (ILC Draft articles 5, 8 and 9). 
 
The consequence of state responsibility is that the responsible state is obliged to compensate 
injured states and possibly the international community (ILC Draft articles, part II, article 
31). 
4.5.1.1 State responsibility where company employees are 
combatants 
The distinction between combatants and non-combatants is made only in instruments 
applicable to international armed conflicts (for an account of regulations applicable in 
internal conflicts, see chapter 4.5.1.4). The following regulations apply if the PSC employees 
are considered members of the armed forces under article 43 of Additional Protocol I. They 
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also apply if PSC employees are members of the armed forces or militias forming part of the 
armed forces under article 4A(1) of Geneva Convention III, or if employees constitute 
members of independent, allied militias or ”other volunteer corps” under article 4A(2) of the 
same convention. I concluded in chapter 3 that although PSC employees rarely would qualify 
as combatants (and prisoners-of-war) under the above regulations, it is not excluded. 
 
If a PSC constitutes the armed forces or otherwise falls under article 4A(1) of the Third 
Geneva Convention (or article 43 of Additional Protocol I), that PSC will also constitute a 
State organ within the meaning of article 4 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Repsonsibility, 
of which para. 1 reads: 
 
“The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, 
whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever 
position it holds in the organisation of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the 
central or of a territorial unit of the State.” 
 
Accordingly the conduct of such a PSC would be attributable to the state for the purposes of 
state responsibility. 
 
I concluded earlier that it is unlikely that any PSC would fulfil the criteria of constituting an 
independent militia within the meaning of article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention. 
Still, if the criteria are fulfilled in a particular case, the PSC in question would not constitute a 
State organ under article 4 of the ILC Draft Articles, but instead fall under article 5 of the 
ILC Draft Articles, which reads: 
 
“The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under article 4 but which is 
empowered by the law of the State to exercise elements of governmental authority shall be 
considered an act of the State under international law, provided the person or entity is acting in 
that capacity in the particular instance.” 
 
A PSC that fulfils the criteria in article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention is necessarily 
engaged in activities which require the exercise of elements of governmental authority (i.e. 
fighting an international armed conflict on behalf of the state). This means that the conduct of 
such a PSC is attributable to the state under article 5 of the ILC Draft Articles. I will make a 
more thorough examination of the application of article 5 shortly.  
 49 
4.5.1.2 State responsibility where company employees are civilians 
I will now examine state responsibility in cases where PSC employees have the status of 
civilians under international humanitarian law, but have some connection with the state 
apparatus. In such cases, state responsibility may be based on articles 5 and 8 of the ILC 
Draft Articles (conduct of persons or entities exercising elements of governmental authority 
respectively conduct directed, controlled or instructed by the state). One possible connection, 
which I will consider, exists when PSC employees constitute “persons who accompany the 
armed forces” according to article 4A (4) of the Third Geneva Convention. State 
responsibility in cases involving sub-contracting will also be examined. 
 
State responsibility under article 5 of the ILC Draft Articles 
The decisive criterion in article 5 of the ILC Draft (reproduced just above), is that the person 
or entity engaging in a particular conduct is empowered by the law of the state to exercise 
elements of governmental authority. Provided that the person or entity is acting in that 
capacity in the particular instance, the conduct is considered an act of the state under 
international law. 
 
A function entails governmental authority within the meaning of article 5 either because the 
function is required by the law of occupation or because the function constitutes an intrinsic 
state function. The Third Geneva Convention requires states to fulfil certain obligations, 
many (but not all) of which presuppose the performance of military functions. Military 
functions imply the exercise of governmental authority within the meaning of article 5 of the 
ILC Draft Articles. If a state hires a private company to carry out such functions, the conduct 
of that company and its employees will thus be attributable to the state and entail 
international responsibility. 
 
There are different opinions as to what exactly constitutes intrinsic state functions when it 
comes to activities in a combat zone. Some consider that virtually everything associated with 
the conduct of hostilities are functions that require governmental authority; others find that 
definition too broad
145
. Let us take the example of a PSC hired by a private oil company to 
guard oilfields in Iraq during a period when the country is under foreign occupation. The 
conduct of that PSC would probably not be attributable to the occupying power based solely 
on the latter’s status as occupant. It might be different if there is a contract between the oil 
company and the occupying power, but there is no clear answer to this. 
 
However, it is not enough that the private company carries out a function entailing 
governmental authority. In order for the conduct of a private company to be attributable to the 
state under article 5, the company must also be “empowered by the law of the State”. It is not 
clear how specific this law must be. It seems unreasonable, however, to require a specific law 
empowering each PSC to carry out certain functions. Rather, the criterion is probably 
fulfilled if the law empowers a certain governmental authority to delegate its powers to a 
private actor. 
 
State responsibility under article 8 of the ILC Draft Articles 
Article 8 of the ILC Draft Articles reads: 
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“The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under 
international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or 
under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.” 
 
Cases involving PSCs may in the first hand give rise to state responsibility on the basis of 
governmental instructions, rather than direction or control on the part of a state. One might 
ask whether the formulation “acting on the instructions of … that State in carrying out the 
conduct” implies that the instructions must refer to the wrongful act itself, considering that 
also the official Commentary to the ILC Draft Articles, article 8, refers to “instructions of the 
State in carrying out the wrongful act”146. According to the Commentary, it is clear that the 
instructions (or direction or control) must relate to the conduct that is said to have amounted 
to an internationally wrongful act. Questions then arise as to state responsibility for actions 
going beyond the instructions given. PSC employees may, for example, engage in activities 
which contravenes both the instructions or directions given and the international obligations 
of the instructing state. According to the Commentary, these cases can be resolved by asking 
whether the unlawful or unauthorized conduct was really incidental to the mission or clearly 
went beyond it. In general, a state giving lawful instructions to persons who are not its organs 
does not assume the risk that the instructions will be carried out in an internationally unlawful 
way. If, on the other hand, persons or groups have committed acts under the effective control 
of a state, the conditions for attribution will be met even if particular instructions may have 
been ignored.
147
 
 
The next question is what type of instructions would lead to state responsibility in cases 
involving PSCs. It is unclear whether a contract in itself would constitute “instructions” 
within the meaning of article 8. It seems on the other hand clear among many experts that 
where rules of engagement (ROE) are part of the contract, the contract in question would 
constitute “instructions” under article 8. Many experts furthermore agree that attribution 
under article 8 depends on how clearly the state indicates to the PSC how it wants the 
contract to be performed. The vaguer the instructions are, the more likely is it that the 
conduct of the PSC, including internationally wrongful acts, fit within the instructions, thus 
giving rise to state responsibility.
148
 If, for example, a contract to guard an oil field does not 
include detailed rules of engagement, it follows that the contracted task is to guard the oil 
field and take whatever measures the individual guards subjectively consider necessary. As a 
result, any conduct by a guard amounting to an internationally wrongful act is likely to give 
rise to state responsibility. 
 
PSC employees as ”persons who accompany the armed forces” 
Article 4A(4) of the Third Geneva Convention prescribes: 
 
“Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as 
civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of 
labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they 
have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide 
them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model.” 
 
The enumeration in this article should not be read as exclusive; the wording “such as” implies 
that the protection provided for in the article should be granted all contractors who fulfil the 
                                                 
146
 Commentaries to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, ibid. 
footnote 137, first paragraph of the Commentary to article 8. 
147
 Ibid., Commentary to article 8, paras. 7-8. 
148
 Report from the 2005 Expert Meeting on private military contractors, ibid. footnote 83, p. 19. 
 51 
criteria. The phrase “accompany the armed forces” means that there must be a nexus between 
the armed forces and the contractors; it is not enough that the armed forces have issued the 
mentioned identification cards. The contractor must at least carry out some sort of service for 
the armed forces and not only perform a contract for the state. It is not clear, however, 
whether members of the armed forces must be physically present at the location where the 
PSC is operating.
149
 
 
It is a matter of debate whether civilians, who are granted prisoner of war status under article 
4A(4), lose that status if they participate directly in hostilities. According to the dominant 
position, they do lose their prisoner of war status and may be prosecuted for merely 
participating in hostilities. Another position, based on a different, systematic interpretation of 
article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I, claims on the contrary that civilians falling under 
article 4A(4) of the Third Geneva Convention do not lose their prisoner of war status by 
participating directly in hostilities. This latter position is not generally accepted, however, nor 
does it seem to withstand a closer analysis
150
. 
 
State responsibility in cases involving subcontracting 
The issue here is state responsibility for the conduct of a PSC, subcontracted by another PSC, 
that in its turn is contracted by a state. In principle, the state is responsible to the same degree 
for the actions of the subcontractor – provided that the state has permitted its contract partner 
to subcontract. 
 
There is no reason why there would not be attribution under article 5 of the ILC Draft 
Articles, provided that the sub-contractor exercises governmental authority and is empowered 
by the law of the state to perform the particular task. 
 
Under article 8, the decisive issue is whether the PSC contracted by the state is allowed to 
subcontract, either because the contract explicitly allows subcontracting, or because the 
contract is silent on the issue. In both cases the state would normally incur responsibility were 
the PSC to subcontract. Where the contract explicitly allows subcontracting, one decisive 
factor is whether the contract includes a requirement that any subcontract must include the 
same terms related to the rules of engagement as the original contract between the state and 
the PSC. The substance of these terms may decide whether the wrongful conduct can be 
attributed to the state. If, in contrast, the contract does not permit subcontracting and the PSC 
subcontracts anyway, thus exceeding its authority within the meaning of article 7 of the ILC 
Draft Articles
151
, the state would not – in contrast to article 5, where there would be 
attribution under similar circumstances – bear responsibility. 
 
I will return to the question of state responsibility based on the concept of due diligence. It is 
worth mentioning here, however, that it is plausible that a state, in a case involving 
subcontracting, can be held responsible because it has failed to exercise due diligence by not 
explicitly addressing the possibility of subcontracting in the original state – PSC contract. 
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Such responsibility is likely to be limited to cases where the harmful conduct takes place 
within the jurisdiction of the contracting state, however
152
. 
4.5.1.3 State responsibility where company employees are 
mercenaries 
For the purpose of state responsibility under articles 5 and 8 of the ILC Draft Articles, it 
makes no difference whether the PSC employees constitute mercenaries according to 
Additional Protocol I, article 47. The OAU/AU and UN Conventions on mercenarism may 
create further legal bases for state responsibility. I will not go further into that issue here. 
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4.5.1.4 State responsibility for company conduct in non-
international armed conflicts 
Non-international armed conflicts are situations of insurrection within a state. Where a state 
hires a PSC to help put down the insurrection, articles 4, 5 and 8 of the ILC Draft Articles 
may be applicable. 
 
With respect to instructions according to article 8, there is no difference between international 
armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts, thus reference can be made to what 
has been said above. 
 
For state responsibility to exist otherwise in non-international armed conflicts, the PSC must 
either: 
 
a. constitute a state organ under article 4 of the ILC Draft Articles (for example by 
constituting the state’s armed forces under Additional Protocol II to the Geneva 
Conventions, article 1(1)), or 
b. exercise elements of governmental authority under article 5 of the ILC Draft Articles. 
 
It has been discussed whether the term “armed forces” is broader under Additional Protocol II 
(applicable to non-international armed conflicts) than under Additional Protocol I (applicable 
to international armed conflicts), therefore more likely to include PSCs. This view finds some 
support in the ICRC Commentary to article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II, which states that 
“the term ‘armed forces’ … should be understood in the broadest sense. In fact, this term was 
chosen in preference to others suggested, such as, for example, ‘regular armed forces’, in 
order to cover all the armed forces, including those not included in the definition of the army 
in the national legislation of some countries.”153 
 
In most cases relating to non-international armed conflicts, state responsibility for the 
conduct of PSCs will arise under article 5 of the ILC Draft Articles. It is clear that fighting a 
civil war constitutes an exercise of elements of governmental authority within the meaning of 
article 5. Thus, where a state hires a PSC to partake in such a war, the conduct of that PSC 
will be attributable to the state. In one case involving “village guards”, armed and paid by the 
Turkish state, but not members of the Turkish armed forces, its gendarmerie or otherwise 
employed by the state, the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR) determined 
that Turkey was indeed responsible for the guards’ conduct154. 
 
Thus, it seems that the threshold for attributing the conduct of PSCs to states may be lower in 
non-international armed conflicts than in international armed conflicts. It is worth noting, 
however, that article 91 of Additional Protocol I makes the state responsible also for private 
acts of members of its armed forces in international armed conflicts, something which is not 
the case in non-international armed conflicts. 
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4.5.2 State responsibility where company conduct is not 
attributable to the state 
4.5.2.1 States’ obligation to protect human rights 
General features of states’ obligation to protect human rights 
International human rights law obliges states to protect the human rights of all persons – 
citizens and foreigners alike – within their jurisdiction. The obligation to protect, including 
states’ duty to act with due diligence, determines in the first hand the duties of states in 
relation to abuses committed by non-state agents. 
 
International human rights law applies also in situations of armed conflict and exceptions can 
be made only in accordance with the terms of the respective convention
155
. However, certain 
rights may under no circumstances be derogated from, notably the right to life and the 
prohibition against torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment. Humanitarian law often 
constitutes lex specialis, and is as such decisive when it comes to interpreting a specific 
human right in a conflict situation
156
. As with international humanitarian law, states cannot 
escape their responsibilities with regard to human rights by transferring tasks to private 
subjects. 
 
A couple of cases before the ECHR has helped clarify states’ duty to protect human rights, 
including the standard of due diligence. In the case Osman v. UK, which concerned an 
alleged deprivation of the right to life, the Court determined that: 
 
“… the right to life under the convention may also imply, in certain defined circumstances, a 
positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive, operational measures to protect an 
individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual.”157 
 
With respect to inhuman and degrading treatment, the ECHR has decided a case involving 
the abuse of children in their home, E. and Others v. UK. The court found that the 
governmental authority in question should have been aware of the abuse and should have 
taken measures to protect the children, and further held that: 
 
“[certain enumerated concrete measures] … would not necessarily have either uncovered the 
abuse or prevented it. The test under Article 3 however does not require it to be shown that “but 
for” the failing or omission of the public authority ill-treatment would not have happened. A 
failure to take reasonably available measures which could have had a real prospect of altering 
the outcome or mitigating the harm is sufficient to engage the responsibility of the State.”158 
[My emphasis] 
 
The standard of duty is thus, according to the ECHR, for the state to take reasonably available 
measures, which have a real prospect of altering the outcome or mitigating the harm. The 
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Inter-American Court, the Commission on Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee 
impose similar positive obligations on states
159
. After concluding that a certain conduct by a 
PSC is not attributable to the hiring state under the ILC Draft Articles, a court can thus apply 
the above standard. If the state has not itself hired the PSC, the duty to act would most likely 
be more limited, since the state in such a case could not be expected to have the same insight 
into the PSC activities. It is likely that state responsibility in those cases presupposes that the 
harmful conduct took place within the jurisdiction of the state in question. 
 
Three types of states might have obligations to protect human rights in relation to a particular 
PSC: 
 
- the state which hires the PSC (hereinafter the hiring state) 
- the state on whose territory the conduct is carried out (hereinafter the host state) 
- the state in which the PSC is incorporated (hereinafter the home state) 
 
States’ obligation to protect human rights implies taking different measures depending on the 
relationship between the PSC and the particular state. The duty to regulate more generally the 
conduct of PSCs falls primarily on the home state. The hiring state is, in the first hand, 
obliged to regulate its contract with the individual PSC. The host state (or another state or 
power exercising jurisdiction and thus control over the territory where the PSC operates) has 
an obligation to protect the human rights of its citizens and foreigners through various 
measures. If the territory is under belligerent occupation, the occupying power carries that 
responsibility (see below, chapter 4.5.2.2, on international humanitarian law). Under human 
rights law the decisive factor is the exercise of effective control, irrespective of whether the 
state’s presence is regarded as belligerent occupation or not. In the case of Iraq, for example, 
during such time as the CPA was exercising control as the occupying power, the CPA 
investigated incidents involving PSCs. 
 
The obligation to protect human rights imposes a duty on states to prevent and investigate 
incidents of violence involving private actors, and to provide jurisdiction with a view to 
prosecuting offenders and providing reparation to victims.
160
 
 
The obligation to prevent human rights abuses 
When looking at existing court practice, it seems that there is a rather high threshold for 
determining that a state has failed in its obligation to protect human rights because it has not 
taken enough measures to prevent one private person from harming another. 
 
As of today, it is not possible to hold companies as entities responsible under international 
criminal law. It is, on the other hand, possible to hold states responsible under international 
law for damages caused by private firms, provided that the state has not fulfilled its 
international obligation to prevent or stop activities within its territory that cause serious 
damages outside that territory. 
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There are two situations giving rise to obligations for states to take positive steps to prevent 
harmful conduct by PSCs. The first situation is where a state has, or should have, reason to 
believe that a particular PSC is involved in conduct that would constitute a violation of 
human rights were it carried out by the state. This situation came up in the above-mentioned 
Osman case
161
. It is not necessary for the state to have reason to believe that a particular 
individual is at risk – rather, the state has an obligation to prevent abuses where it regards, or 
should regard, the PSC itself as a risk factor. 
 
The second situation is where the PSC is involved in an inherently dangerous situation, for 
example guarding an oil pipeline in a volatile area. Here, the PSC’s use of force is 
foreseeable and thus there is a real possibility of killings, which would constitute arbitrary 
killings were they committed by a state. In this situation, a hiring state in particular should be 
obliged to take measures to prevent such killings. 
 
The enhanced obligation to prevent abuses applies to all three of the above-mentioned type 
states. Which measures a state can be required to take in the particular case depends primarily 
on its relation with the company. One measure that obviously comes to mind is regulation. 
Regulations are one of the basic tools available to states to prevent various forms of 
misconduct or abuse. With regard to a possible duty to regulate PSCs, however, there is 
probably a very high threshold for a court to decide that national regulations are deficient to a 
degree that it constitutes a breach of the state’s obligation to protect human rights162. Courts 
would probably be more willing to find that a state has an obligation to regulate in cases 
where (1) the PSC is more or less closely connected to the state, or (2) where the PSC is 
conducting an inherently dangerous activity. 
 
The duty to regulate relates to the obligation to prevent abuses, as well as the obligation to 
investigate abuses and provide remedy. I will return to the two latter stages further below. 
The obligation to prevent through regulation relates first of all to the individual contract. 
There are thus strong arguments that a state hiring a PSC to carry out tasks in an area of 
hostilities has an obligation to regulate the contract carefully. 
 
International human rights law imposes an obligation on states to regulate in a particular area, 
for example a certain industry or segments of an industry, where necessary. Article 2 (2) of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter the ICCPR) provides a 
basis for such an obligation. The provision reads: 
 
“Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to 
the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes and with provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such legislative 
or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant.” 163 
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It can be argued that this provision implies an obligation for home and host states to issue 
industry-wide regulations that, among other things, allow the state to exercise control and 
jurisdiction over PSCs and their employees. Such industry-wide regulations might also 
require PSCs to operate under clear rules of engagement, as well as giving the state a 
possibility to revoke PSC licenses or take other measures with a view to stopping unaccepted 
activities. 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights does not contain an explicit requirement similar 
to the one in the ICCPR
164
, but the European Court of Human Rights has held that a state, 
under certain circumstances, may be obliged to enact legislation in order to prevent 
systematic violations of human rights
165
. Similarly, the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (hereinafter the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Torture) has called upon states to abolish provisions of domestic law allowing 
corporal punishment, in order to comply with their obligations under the Convention against 
Torture
166
. Some more proactive commentators have pointed out that states’ duty to respect, 
protect and fulfil human rights through the regulation of private actors needs to go beyond 
merely providing for judicial determinations of liability once violations have already 
occurred
167
. 
 
Beyond the earlier mentioned small category of international crimes, there is no general 
obligation on states under international human rights law to exercise extraterritorial 
jurisdiction (understood here as a combination of adjudicative and prescriptive jurisdiction) 
with a view to promoting and protecting internationally recognized human rights outside their 
territory. Due to the inconsistent ratification among states of human rights treaties, it is more 
useful to consider whether customary international law can shed some light on the issue of 
home state regulation of PSC activities abroad. Under customary international law, states are 
obliged to exercise due diligence in protecting foreigners on their territory, including actions 
from non-state actors. It is unlikely, however, that this could be pushed to require states to 
regulate (and provide remedies for) the extraterritorial activities of multinational 
companies
168
. Thus, neither the treaty regime nor customary international law imposes an 
obligation on states to regulate multinational companies abroad; on the other hand, 
international law allows states the freedom to do so, under the active personality principle
169
. 
It is unclear whether a state that does choose to regulate its multinational companies thereby 
                                                 
164
 See article 2 (1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(hereinafter the European Convention on Human Rights), 4 November 1950, 213  UNTS  222, entry into force 3 
September 1953. 
165
 See e.g. Broniowski v. Poland, European Court of Human Rights, App. No. 31443/96, Judgment of 22 June 
2004 (concerning compensation for land expropriation) and the above-mentioned court case A. v. United 
Kingdom (ibid. footnote 162). 
166
 Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, UN General Assembly Doc. A/60/316, 30 August 2005, p. 9, 
para. 28, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/43f30fb40.html , last retrieved on 5 May 2012. 
167
 Summary Report from Workshop on Attributing Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights under 
International Law, convened by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 17 November 2006, p. 3, available at 
http://www.business-humanrights.org/Documents/Workshop-Corp-Responsibility-under-Intl-Law-17-Nov-
2006.pdf , last retrieved on 28 October 2010. 
168
 This matter was discussed at the above-mentioned Workshop on Attributing Corporate Responsibility for 
Human Rights under International Law, where participants generally agreed against such an interpretation, see 
Summary Report from the workshop (ibid.), p. 6. 
169
 The active personality principle in international law means that states are entitled to exercise extraterritorial 
jurisdiction to regulate the activities of its nationals abroad. 
 58 
also is required to provide a remedy, and whether that remedy has to be adjudicative in 
nature
170
. 
 
Another question is whether a home state that indirectly, but actively, contributes to 
extraterritorial human rights abuses by a multinational company, for example by providing 
finance or support via its embassy in the host state, will be in breach of its international 
obligations. This is yet to be determined. It might be argued that a state that finances a PSC 
has some obligation to regulate how that PSC behaves, considering the duty under customary 
international law not to finance activities aimed at the “violent overthrow of the regime of 
another State”171. It is questionable, though, whether financing alone produces a sufficiently 
close nexus between the state and the PSC to give rise to such an obligation. 
 
The obligation to investigate, prosecute and provide jurisdiction 
The obligation to protect human rights also includes an obligation on the part of states to 
investigate human rights abuses, prosecute offenders and provide jurisdiction enabling 
victims of abuse to obtain reparations
172
. In particular, the state where the PSC is 
incorporated – the home state – must be able to bring criminal procedures against PSC 
employees who have committed serious crimes abroad. The obligation depends to a certain 
extent on the crime or activity. For example, the Convention against Torture provides that 
states parties shall ensure that all acts of torture, as well as attempts to commit torture and 
complicity or participation in torture, are offences under criminal law and that these offences 
are punishable. This may be relevant, for example, in a case of systematic ill-treatment of 
detainees in a detention centre run by a PSC. On the other hand, there may not be a violation 
of human rights law if the host state fails to investigate and prosecute lesser, non-
international crimes or offences, even if they are widespread or systematic. 
 
Where a PSC is incorporated in one state and employs nationals of another state, the state of 
nationality would also be obliged to investigate and prosecute those of its nationals who have 
committed serious, international crimes, such as war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
 
The right of access to a court
173
 enabling individuals, including foreigners, to bring claims 
against PSCs is also relevant, primarily with regard to the state where the PSC is incorporated 
or otherwise has a sufficiently close connection. It is not certain, however, that states have an 
obligation to provide jurisdiction for claims against foreigners who have committed crimes 
extraterritorially (e.g. foreign employees of a PSC incorporated in the state)
174
. 
 
The above principles are also reflected in the earlier mentioned Montreux Document (parts 
A-D), which reflects existing international law of state responsibilities relevant to PSCs. 
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4.5.2.2 Obligations of a due diligence nature in international 
humanitarian law 
Unlike violations of human rights law, violations of international humanitarian law can be 
committed by states and private actors alike. Thus, both states and PSC employees may be in 
violation of humanitarian law for actions carried out by PSC employees and both may be held 
legally responsible. 
 
Obligations of the contracting state 
Common article 1 of the Geneva Conventions provides that state parties “undertake to respect 
and ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.” This implies that a state 
contracting a PSC to carry out tasks entailing obligations under the Geneva Conventions is 
obliged to ensure that the PSC fulfils these obligations. The state is thus responsible for any 
violations of the Geneva Conventions committed by the PSC while carrying out tasks given 
by the state. 
 
The concept of due diligence is not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the Geneva 
Conventions. Nevertheless there are substantive obligations of a due diligence character in 
these conventions. For example, the ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols points 
out that “legal writings and case-law show that the responsibility of the State is involved 
[with regard to damages caused by private individuals not members of a state organ] if it has 
not taken such preventive or repressive measures as could reasonably be expected to have 
been taken in the circumstances. In other words, responsibility is incurred if the Party to the 
conflict has not acted with due diligence to prevent such acts from taking place, or to ensure 
their repression once they have taken place.”175 
 
Experts have suggested a number of measures which the contracting state may take with a 
view to complying with its obligation to ensure respect for the Geneva conventions
176
. 
Measures include steps to ensure that PSC employees are properly trained for the task, 
including knowledge of international humanitarian law; that PSCs operate under clear rules 
of engagement and standard operating procedures taking into account international 
humanitarian law; and that any violations are reported to state organs. 
 
There is unfortunately no room within the scope of this thesis to explore states’ obligations 
flowing from Common Article 1 further
177
. It is worth pointing out, however, that many tasks 
carried out in conflict situations require the exercise of governmental authority (e.g. functions 
relating to prisoners of war, as discussed earlier). If that is the case, the conduct of a PSC 
carrying out these functions falls under article 5 of the ILC Draft Articles and is thus 
attributable to the state, making the concept of due diligence irrelevant. In those cases, 
however, the contracting state can be held responsible for the PSC conduct only to the extent 
that the conduct can be attributed to the state under article 5 or article 8 of the ILC Draft 
Articles. If, for example, an occupying power contracts a PSC to deliver food to the 
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inhabitants of the occupied territory in accordance with article 55 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention and the PSC fails to deliver, the state can be held responsible for the failure to 
deliver food. If, on the other hand, the PSC delivers the food, but an incident occurs during 
the transport, the state can be held responsible for the incident only to the extent that the 
conduct of the PSC can be attributed to the state under article 5 or article 8 of the ILC Draft 
Articles. 
 
Obligations of states other than the contracting state 
Beside the contracting state it is, as was discussed earlier, primarily the home state and the 
state on whose territory the PSC operates that may have obligations under international 
humanitarian law with regard to the PSC. These states may or may not be parties to the 
conflict (although the state on whose territory the PSC operates often will be). 
 
Common article 1 of the Geneva Conventions is generally not interpreted as an obligation of 
result for states who are not parties to the conflict
178
. Common Article 1 is therefore of 
limited practical importance for the state of incorporation and for the state on whose territory 
the PSC operates. It has been suggested that these two states, by enacting an adequate 
regulatory framework for PSCs, thereby could discharge their obligation under Common 
Article 1
179
. On the other hand, it is unlikely that a failure alone by a state to adopt a 
regulatory framework would constitute a violation of Common Article 1. Any duty for the 
incorporating state to regulate rather stems from the due diligence concept under human 
rights law. The incorporating state may thus be obliged to ensure that an incorporated PSC 
respects humanitarian law as a part of human rights law. However, such an obligation 
presupposes that the (potential) abuses are subject to the state’s jurisdiction (see above, 
chapter 4.5.2.1). 
 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has addressed the particular issue of a state’s duty to 
exercise due diligence (or “vigilance”) where the state is an occupying power (these duties 
include upholding not only humanitarian law, but also human rights law). In the case 
Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda (Case Concerning Armed Activities in the 
Territory of the Congo, 2005) the ICJ found that Uganda was an occupying power in a certain 
district of the Democratic Republic of the Congo within the meaning of article 42 of the 
Hague Regulations of 1907. Therefore, the Court concluded, Uganda was obliged, under 
article 43 of the Hague Regulations, to “take all measures in its power to restore, and ensure, 
as far as possible, public order and safety in the occupied area”. The Court subsequently 
pointed out that article 43 entails a duty to exercise due diligence with regard to the conduct 
of private actors: “This obligation comprised the duty to secure respect for the applicable 
rules of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, to protect the 
inhabitants of the occupied territory against acts of violence, and not to tolerate such violence 
by a third party.” The Court consequently found that Uganda’s responsibility was engaged 
both for violations of international obligations committed by its military and for any lack of 
vigilance in preventing violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by 
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other actors present in the occupied territory, including rebel groups acting on their own 
account.
180
 
 
The above-mentioned Montreux Document (parts A-D), reflecting existing international law, 
contains the main elements of what has been said above. The responsibilities of states 
providing finance to PSCs was discussed in chapter 4.5.2.1. 
 
Obligations of all states under the Geneva Conventions 
With respect to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, states are required to exercise 
universal jurisdiction over offenders in accordance with common article 49 (2) / 50 (2) / 129 
(2) / 146 (2) of the Geneva Conventions and the principle of erga omnes obligations. 
Unfortunately, state practice with regard to the implementation of this duty is inconsistent
181
. 
 
Common article 49 (3) / 50 (3) / 129 (3) / 146 (3) of the Geneva Conventions reads: 
 
“Each High Contracting Party shall take the measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the 
provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches defined in the following Article.” 
 
According to the Commentary to the Geneva Conventions, the term “suppression” “[…] 
covers everything a State can do to prevent the commission or the repetition of acts contrary 
to the Convention.” After referring to a number of past national prosecutions for violations 
other than grave breaches, the Commentary concludes that “… all breaches of the Convention 
should be repressed by national legislation. The Contracting Parties … should at least insert 
in their legislation a general clause providing for the punishment of other breaches. 
Furthermore, … the authorities of the Contracting Parties should give all those subordinate to 
them instructions in conformity with the Convention and should institute judicial or 
disciplinary punishment for breaches of the Convention.”182 The term “should” indicates that 
the provision of jurisdiction for non-grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions is no 
obligation, however. In addition, it can be argued that if the drafters of the Geneva 
Conventions intended the provision of jurisdiction for non-grave breaches to be obligatory for 
states parties, they would have been explicit about it. Still, commentators do not quite agree 
on this matter
183
. 
 
As humanitarian law stands today, there is no obligation of result flowing from Common 
Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions alone. Common Article 1 does thus not have any erga 
omnes effect. Apart from cases involving grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, 
therefore, states having no connection to the PSC in question have, at most, only a general 
duty to exert what influence they can. This may include bringing complaints against the 
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offending state and working within the UN system toward producing condemnations or 
otherwise bringing the matter onto the agenda.
184
  
                                                 
184
 Henckaerts, and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, ibid. footnote 178, Rule 144, 
Vol. I, Rules, pp. 509-513, and Vol. II, Practice, pp. 3288-3302. 
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4.6 Reparations 
While there is no room within the scope of this thesis to explore the subject of reparations in 
detail, I will make a few remarks on the subject, in order to make the picture more complete 
and point to certain legal gaps. 
4.6.1 Reparations where the conduct is attributable to the 
state 
Where human rights are violated and the violation can be attributed to a state under articles 4, 
5 or 8 of the ILC Draft Articles, that state is obliged to make reparation. Article 13 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, for example, provides that “[e]veryone whose rights 
and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy 
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons 
acting in an official capacity.” The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
contains a similar provision (see the ICCPR, article 2 (3)). 
 
Where violations of humanitarian law are committed in an international armed conflict and 
the violations are attributable to a state, that state has an obligation under both written and 
customary law to make reparation
185
. A key question, however, is whether an individual can 
claim personal reparation for violations of international humanitarian law. State practice is 
unclear in this regard. States clearly are obliged to make reparation, but this often comes in 
the form of satisfaction (such as an official excuse) or measures for rehabilitation provided 
for in a peace treaty.
186
 
 
If violations of humanitarian law, which are attributable to a state, also constitute violations 
of non-derogable rights under human rights law, individuals have the right to a remedy under 
the latter set of rules. 
4.6.2 Reparations where the conduct is not attributable to 
the state 
4.6.2.1 States’ due diligence obligations 
In cases where a harmful conduct cannot be attributed to any state, no state is obliged to make 
reparation. Nevertheless, the state within whose territory abuses have taken place has certain 
obligations with regard to reparations and other remedies, due to the state’s due diligence 
duties discussed earlier. These duties include investigating crimes and prosecuting offenders, 
providing access to national courts, enforcing judgements and not allowing PSCs any kinds 
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of exemptions under the law.
187
 If the state fails to fulfil these duties, it may, under certain 
conditions, be obliged to make reparations to victims. 
 
It is worth noting that the Montreux Document – which reflects existing international law – 
reiterates the right of victims to reparations only with regard to states with a contractual 
relation to the PSC, making reference to attribution according to customary international law 
of state responsibility. With regard to host states and home states, the Montreux Document 
mentions only the obligation of states to provide effective remedies (cp. articles 4 and 8 with 
articles 10 and 15 of the document). 
4.6.2.2 Liability of the private security company and its employees 
under international humanitarian law 
Clearly, individual PSC employees can commit violations of humanitarian law. It is not clear, 
however, whether a PSC as an entity can commit such violations
188
. According to customary 
humanitarian law of non-international armed conflicts, armed opposition groups do not have 
any obligation to make reparation
189
. In view of this, it is unlikely that PSCs have such an 
obligation. Moreover, it is doubtful whether customary humanitarian law (of international 
and non-international armed conflicts) obliges states to allow claims from individuals against 
PSCs and their employees for violations of humanitarian law
190
. 
 
It is worth emphasising that the fact that a PSC employee is a civilian does not prevent him or 
her from being prosecuted for violations of international humanitarian law. A person’s status 
is not decisive when deciding any criminal responsibility – civilians and combatants are 
equally capable of committing and being prosecuted for war crimes and grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions, in international as well as non-international armed conflicts
191
. Thus, 
the apparent impunity with regard to serious crimes committed at the Abu Ghraib detention 
centre in Iraq, for example, is not a result of an international legal vacuum, but rather of a 
lacking will to prosecute (some of) the persons implicated, practical difficulties related to the 
collection of evidence and procedural issues. I will discuss these aspects in more depth in 
chapter 5. 
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4.6.2.3 Liability of the private security company and its employees 
under international human rights law 
I concluded earlier that if a harmful conduct is not attributable to the state, the state has not 
committed a human rights violation, unless it has failed to exercise due diligence under 
human rights law, e.g. by not preventing abuses. 
 
When it comes to a potential corporate responsibility for human rights abuses, the situation is 
somewhat ambiguous. There is an on-going, broad debate within the international community 
on corporate social responsibilities, including responsibilities for human rights abuses. That 
subject is far too vast to dive into here; suffice it to say that, according to the traditional view, 
states are the primary human rights duty holders. Accordingly, it is the responsibility of states 
to hold companies and their employees responsible in accordance with national law. In line 
with this, companies should respect human rights, understood – at a minimum – as those 
rights expressed in the International Bill of Human Rights. This responsibility is distinct from 
issues of legal liability and enforcement, which is defined largely by national law.
192
 Where a 
company has caused or contributed to an adverse human rights impact the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights requires active engagement in remediation
193
. 
 
Where the conduct of a PSC neither can be attributed to a state nor any state has failed in its 
due diligence obligations, the question arises whether (certain) human rights have horizontal 
effect, i.e. are applicable in relations between private subjects. If so, human rights abuses 
committed by PSC employees might entail a duty on the part of PSCs or the individual 
offender to provide reparation to victims. The issue of possible horizontal effect of human 
rights is controversial, however, and there is no agreement within the international 
community on this matter. It is, on the other hand, clear that private persons can, in times of 
war and peace alike, be held individually responsible directly under international criminal 
law for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. 
 
Relevant sources of international law are on the one hand humanitarian law and human rights 
conventions, such as the Geneva conventions and the UN Convention against torture and 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, on the other hand customary 
international law, notably the crimes enumerated in the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (hereinafter the ICC)
194
. With regard to private security and military firms in conflict 
situations, the crimes most likely to be relevant include war crimes
195
 and crimes against 
humanity
196
, as well as individual cases of forced disappearances
197
 and torture
198
. In those 
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cases, victims may also be able to obtain reparations. However, the jurisdiction of the ICC 
and other international or regional courts and tribunals is normally subsidiary to that of 
national courts, meaning that all national measures must first be exhausted. 
4.6.2.4 National legislation and civil law suits 
A PSC may be held liable under national civil law whether or not a state is also responsible. 
The US Alien Tort Statute (more often called the Alien Tort Claims Act, hereinafter the 
ATCA)
199
 is probably unique in its kind, extending original jurisdiction to US district courts 
over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations 
or a treaty of the United States”. Under the ATCA foreign citizens can thus bring civil law 
suits based on human rights abuses committed outside the United States directly in US 
district courts. A couple of cases dealing with PSC activities (more precisely the interrogation 
methods of certain employees) in Iraq have reached the district courts, but at this point in 
time no ready conclusions can be drawn regarding the application and effectiveness of the 
ATCA in these cases
200
.  
 
It has been suggested that a convention be concluded, under which states undertake to allow 
civil or criminal sanctions with respect to abuses committed by PSCs and other private actors 
abroad
201
, the model being the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(hereinafter the OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention
202
. As of today, however, no such 
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instrument is underway. Moreover, even though legislation such as the ATCA provides the 
perhaps most effective means of holding PSCs accountable at the national level (at least in 
theory), the problem of mass violations and peace agreements excluding individual claims 
remain
203
. Due to limited space, I unfortunately have no possibility to explore this issue 
further, or to give a more detailed account of the ATCA and other national laws in this field. 
 
From the above chapters one can conclude that there clearly are hindrances of a jurisdictional 
and practical nature to overcome in order to create an effective regime for holding 
international companies, including PSCs, accountable. Next, I will dig deeper into and 
elaborate on the more central legal issues and problems presented earlier. 
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5 In-depth discussion and conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate on and discuss the most central legal issues and 
problems identified in the preceding chapters. Subjects will include existing legal gaps, 
options for regulation and ways to improve accountability. Are the current international 
initiatives sufficient and adequate? Finally, I intend to take a glance at the ambitions and 
possible future roles of PSCs in conflict and post-conflict areas. 
5.1 Legal issues related to the status of private 
security company employees and their 
presence in theatre 
I have established that the absolute majority of PSC employees will be categorized as 
civilians under international humanitarian law. Very few will qualify as combatants. 
Furthermore, it is quite clear that, as of today, there is no such category of persons as “quasi-
combatants” or “illegal combatants” in international humanitarian law. Nor is such a new 
category of persons desirable; conferring a special legal status to certain categories of persons 
involved in fighting, without being combatants according to the definition in Additional 
Protocol I, would blur the concept of “civilians” and lead to confusion. It would also create a 
clear danger of misuse of the new concept, as we have seen for example in the case of 
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base. For these – and further – reasons, it is unlikely that any 
proposal to establish a similar third category of persons will find general support within the 
international community. 
 
Any regular participation in hostilities of PSC employees will inevitably lead to confusion as 
to their legal status under humanitarian law. Worse is that it also risks blurring the concept 
“civilian”, something that might compromise the ability of international humanitarian law to 
protect “ordinary” civilians. Therefore, any participation in hostilities of PSC employees 
must be avoided. 
 
Although their status as civilians thus is clear in most cases, the status of PSC employees who 
defend civilian objects (including potentially military objects) in areas of armed conflict is 
shady in some respects. It is clear that civilians who participate in combat lose their immunity 
from attack. One question is whether PSC employees who, under the said circumstances, 
become involved in fighting automatically become a party to the armed conflict. If not, under 
which circumstances do they become such a party? The intensity and duration of fighting 
might be decisive, perhaps in combination with the intent of those involved in the fighting. 
Intent on the part of PSC employees involved in fighting to weaken or defeat a party to the 
conflict suggests that they become a party to the conflict. Alternatively, the way in which 
other parties to the conflict regard their status might be decisive, irrespective of the PSC 
employees’ actions or intent. A similar discussion has come up in relation to peace support 
personnel who become involved in fighting, as mentioned in chapter 3.3.4.1, but has not yet 
produced a ready answer. Another issue in need of clarification is the notion of what 
constitutes combat, including its beginning and duration. 
 
Particular attention should also be given to the question of what constitutes “mission-critical 
activities” or “inherently state functions”, requiring direct control of the state. There is 
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probably a need for some rethinking in this area; how is, for example, the guarding of high-
level leaders or the collection of key intelligence to be categorized? The earlier mentioned 
UN Draft of a possible convention on private military and security companies explicitly 
prohibits the delegation or outsourcing of inherently state functions (article 4(3)), which is 
uncontroversial in itself. However, there is substantial disagreement among states when it 
comes to the definition of this concept (articles 2(i) and 9). The definition namely includes 
several activities that are in fact already outsourced by a number of governments, such as 
intelligence and knowledge transfer with military, security and policing application. In 
reality, the convention only allows PSCs to deal with logistics and other similar services 
(however leaving a loophole open for capacity building under bilateral agreements). It is 
unlikely that states already outsourcing many of the tasks prohibited by the draft convention 
will cease that practice. Since the most central matters, in my opinion, are to prevent 
excessive use of force by PSCs and to ensure accountability for abuses, including reparation 
to victims, it is unfortunate that the draft convention has caused controversy on this more 
peripheral point. I will discuss other controversial aspects of the draft convention further 
below. 
 
For the reasons discussed in chapter 3 and reiterated just above, it is highly unsuitable to use 
PSCs to guard military or potentially military objects in a situation of armed conflict, or 
where such a conflict is likely to break out. If PSCs are hired in such situations, their 
employees need to be fully aware of the consequences of their civilian status and of their 
vulnerable position under humanitarian law. The same applies in other situations where they 
risk becoming involved in fighting. Also in non-international armed conflicts – where the 
issue of prisoner of war status does not arise – PSC employees need to be aware that their 
employer, the PSC, might become a party to the conflict under international law. If that 
happens, all the PSC’s employees lose their immunity from attack and they risk committing 
war crimes as a result of their participation in the conflict. Next, I will elaborate on the 
possibility to improve the situation in this and other regards through regulation and other 
legal measures. 
5.2 Regulation of private security companies’ 
presence in theatre 
The main legal gaps with regard to PSC activities lie in the inadequacy of national regulatory 
regimes to exercise control over PSCs. In this regard, material rules and issues related to the 
exercise of jurisdiction are of equal importance. As pointed out in chapter 4.5, states have an 
implied duty to regulate in cases where they incur international responsibility for the actions 
of private actors. Thus, the main legal gaps should arise in cases where there is no state 
responsibility. However, in many cases involving PSCs, state responsibility is still uncertain. 
Therefore, clearer regulation is needed to clarify both when there is state responsibility for the 
actions of PSCs and the extent of this responsibility, including due diligence obligations. 
 
To begin with, there are legal gaps with regard to whether and under which conditions PSCs 
should be allowed in the theatre of operations during armed conflict. Although anti-
mercenary norms provide some regulation, they are, as we have seen, inadequate and rarely 
applicable to PSCs. Voices have been raised proposing that PSCs should be explicitly 
prohibited from engaging in certain activities – in the first hand combat – altogether. 
However, PSCs are already prohibited under international law from taking direct part in 
hostilities, unless they are incorporated into a state’s armed forces. Moreover, PSCs are 
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normally contracted to perform tasks other than combat, nevertheless ending up fighting off 
attackers in a way comparable to combat. I cannot see how a prohibition could be formulated 
and be both firm enough and flexible enough to fulfil its purpose. 
 
Now, if a state engages a PSC to guard a military object in a situation of armed conflict, it is a 
fiction to say that the PSC is not hired to engage in combat. It can therefore be argued that a 
state engaging a PSC to guard a (potentially) military object – whether there is an ongoing 
armed conflict or not – should be required to incorporate the guards into the state’s armed 
forces. The same applies to PSCs hired by governments to carry out civilian tasks in conflict 
areas where the hiring state’s armed forces are present. Some states already require civilians 
with key functions in society to serve in the armed forces as reservists; it is thus easy for 
states wishing to integrate PSCs employees and other civilians into their armies to do so. 
Incorporation into the armed forces would serve two purposes: first it would counteract 
confusion as to the said persons’ status and powers, second it would enhance accountability 
by ensuring that the hiring state can exercise jurisdiction over the incorporated individuals. In 
these cases, there will be no legal gaps and no need for further regulation. 
 
As mentioned just above, the main legal gaps exist where there is no state responsibility. One 
case where this is likely to occur is the quite common situation where a PSC is hired by 
another private company, for example within the extraction industry. These contracts often 
relate to tasks in areas where humanitarian law does not apply, including areas of low-
intensity conflict. In these situations, home states are in a position to follow-up on the 
conduct of PSCs and prevent misconduct through regulation. By introducing a licensing 
system or by issuing contract permits (or combining these two methods), home states can 
contribute to filling out some of the above-mentioned legal gaps, while also fulfilling their 
due diligence obligations under human rights law. Also the host state is in a position to 
introduce licensing and monitoring systems. The earlier mentioned UN Draft Convention on 
private military and security companies contains a rather elaborate article on this subject 
(article 15). The main problem here lies in a possible lack of motivation or capacity on the 
part of those states to take effective measures to exercise control over these companies. Even 
if there is a licensing system, effective monitoring and other follow-up may be impaired by 
difficult circumstances on the ground in conflict areas. If the host state lacks effective follow-
up mechanisms (which is often the case in conflict prone areas), the home state is less likely 
to be able to achieve successful monitoring. 
 
Another area with significant legal gaps is PSCs that are not incorporated into any state or 
which otherwise seek to escape regulation (sometimes referred to as “rogue” PSCs). I have 
not been able to find information on the magnitude of this particular problem within 
reasonable time, but much would certainly be gained through improved cooperation between 
states and other international actors. 
 
For PSCs operating in conflict areas without being incorporated into a state’s armed forces 
regulation should focus on rules of engagement, preventing PSCs participation in combat and 
any excessive use of force, remedies to victims and matters related to jurisdiction. Below 
follows first a more detailed discussion on possible measures in terms of material regulation 
of PSCs present in theatre. Thereafter follows a discussion on jurisdictional matters and 
means to enhance accountability. 
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5.2.1 Material regulation of private security companies 
present in theatre 
I mentioned earlier a couple of proposals put forward with a view to enhancing accountability 
of PSCs and their employees through international regulation (see chapter 4.1). One such 
proposal was to change the definition of a mercenary, another to adopt an international 
convention on the subject of PSCs, alternatively on the transfer of military services. 
 
Changing the definition of a mercenary is, in my view, neither a realistic, nor an effective 
way to tackle the problem. As we have seen, the absolute majority of PSC employees fall far 
short of fulfilling the present criteria of a mercenary. In order to encompass the undesired 
behaviour of these employees, one would have to use a definition of a mercenary being very 
far from the traditional meaning of the term. In addition, PSC employees are already 
prohibited under international law from taking direct part in combat. Moreover, existing 
international penal law is sufficient to punish serious violations of international human rights 
and humanitarian law. This said, there are, as I shall discuss shortly, regulatory deficiencies 
with regard to prosecution of crimes other than grave breaches of human rights and 
humanitarian law. In addition, existing international and national penal regulations need to be 
more effectively enforced and problems related to jurisdiction, immunity and other forms of 
impunity need to be overcome. Many national penal regimes probably also need to be 
complemented or elaborated with a view to covering human rights abuses committed by PSC 
employees. 
5.2.1.1 The case for an international convention 
An international convention, similar to the proposed UN Draft Convention on Private 
Military and Security Companies, would serve several purposes in terms of clarifying state 
respectively PSC responsibilities, streamlining regulation and pressing for improved 
monitoring and remedial arrangements. A convention limited to the transfer of military 
services, such as the one suggested by Milliard (see above, chapter 4.1), would not be 
sufficient from a human rights point of view, since it would cover only the transfer of 
military services to national armed forces, not other forms of deployment of PSCs. 
 
As I mentioned in chapter 2.1, many western states consider the adoption of an international 
convention on the subject of PSCs premature. Those states instead propose clarification and 
implementation of existing norms, in line with the Montreux process, in combination with 
self-regulation by the industry. In my view, the effectiveness of any regulation is not 
necessarily decided by its form – many binding conventions are ineffectively implemented in 
practice (in particular in the field of human rights, unfortunately), while other forms of 
instruments may prove surprisingly forceful. It all comes down to the will and capacity of 
those tasked to implement it and those set up to follow-up on the implementation.  
 
PSC activities are a difficult area to regulate at the international level, considering the 
complexity of the issue and the diverse political interests involved. This being said, I want to 
make a couple of notes on the contents of the proposed UN Draft Convention. First, the 
convention reflects the fact that there are some unclear issues related to jurisdiction, which 
the Draft Convention leaves to states to solve (cp. the draft, article 21). Thus, many 
complicated – and weighty – issues related to jurisdiction remain unsolved also with the 
proposed Draft Convention. Another, rather curious, point is that the Draft Convention 
outlaws the outsourcing or privatisation of many functions that several states in fact already 
outsource (cp. the Draft Convention, article 9). It is not realistic to anticipate that those states 
 72 
will cease that practice. Moreover, the Draft Convention imposes state responsibilities (on 
home states) that stretches much further than existing customary international law, by 
establishing that each state party bears responsibility for the military and security activities of 
PSCs registered or operating in their jurisdiction, irrespective of any contractual relation 
between the state and the PSC (article 4 (1)). To impose a responsibility on states for the 
activities of PSCs, solely based on registration within the state’s jurisdiction seems unrealistic 
and too far-reaching. 
 
In short, whether or not a convention regulating the PSC industry will be a reality probably 
depends on the states backing the Montreux process. In the light of the objections voiced by 
many Western governments, in particular, it seems less likely that the proposed convention 
will be an effective tool in the near future. In the present situation, advances may in fact be 
easier to achieve unilaterally, bilaterally and regionally. In many cases, new regulations and 
other measures aimed at improving a situation or otherwise bring about change in a particular 
field are best tried out on a smaller scale, evaluated and then, in relevant parts, implemented 
on a larger scale. In my view, many elements of the UN Draft Convention might be 
implemented by states and intergovernmental organizations, alone or jointly, whether or not 
the proposed convention is adopted. Thus, the on-going process and work being carried out in 
various fora have the potential not only to clarify existing law and responsibilities, but also to 
fill out gaps in the law. 
 
Focus should be on preventing excessive use of force and achieving accountability, including 
reparation to victims. The Montreux process and the International Code of Conduct for 
Private Security Service Providers will contribute to clarifying how existing international law 
– notably human rights law, humanitarian law, international criminal law, and public 
international law on the use of force – is applicable to the activities of PSCs and their 
relations with governments. Subsequently, the most pressing issue to deal with is ensuring 
accountability, including the establishment and exercise of jurisdiction and reparations to 
victims. This presupposes the establishment of national mechanisms related to licensing, 
registration, reporting and other means of oversight, such as those mentioned in articles 13-16 
in the UN Draft Convention. 
5.2.1.2 The Montreux process and the International Code of 
conduct 
The Montreux Document 
The Montreux Document is not a proactive document, but reflects existing law on state 
responsibility relevant to PSCs. Being the result of cooperation between the Swiss 
government and the ICRC, with input from a large number of governments, NGOs and 
industry representatives, the Montreux Document contains generally respected and credible 
standards on which other regulatory initiatives can be built. Endorsing states commit 
themselves to align their domestic laws and administrative practices with its provisions. The 
document also foresees that states take other regulatory steps, such as monitoring 
mechanisms. 
 
On the negative side one might mention that the Montreux Document is somewhat 
cumbersome as a tool for PSCs themselves (although it is not in the first hand intended as 
such). In addition, it does not cover all issues and situations relevant to PSCs. However, it 
provides a basis for states to work with the PSC industry in developing more detailed and 
practical guidance, such as the recently adopted International Code of Conduct for Private 
Security Service Providers and further follow-up on that document. The Montreux Document 
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is also useful as a starting point to clarify the respective due diligence obligations of states 
and PSCs, although further work is needed in this respect (work that might involve also the 
insurance industry). One might also have wished for more specific guidance on remedial 
arrangements – both governmental and corporate ones – in cases of PSC misconduct; the 
document’s provisions on this subject are rather elementary and, in addition, scattered over 
different parts of the document. 
 
Potentially, the Montreux Document can be developed into an instrument against which to 
evaluate and criticise (perhaps even litigate, although private litigation has not been 
particularly effective so far) the conduct of states and PSCs. However, there is need for 
significant further efforts to create effective implementation mechanisms and follow-up to 
give the document some teeth. One such measure already taken on the part of PSCs is the 
recently adopted International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. 
 
International Code of conduct for Private Security Service Providers 
One lesson learned from the examples of PSCs operating in Iraq is that clear and realistic 
mandates, sufficiently detailed rules of engagement and standards of conduct are necessary 
both to prevent misconduct and to provide a basis for determining the respective 
responsibilities of PSCs and states, thus a prerequisite for holding PSCs accountable. In view 
of this, and considering the difficulties and protracted timeline for establishing an 
international convention on the subject, real efforts should be made to further implement the 
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers as a standard in the PSC 
industry. 
 
The stated goal of the International Code of Conduct is that clients of PSCs – governments as 
well as non-governmental clients – include a requirement to adhere to the Code in their 
contractual arrangements. This would lend the Code some teeth, since contractual 
commitments can be upheld in a court of law. However, the effectiveness of such a measure 
will depend on the practical implementation of the Code’s principles into such contracts. The 
same is true with the explicit requirement that companies will make compliance with the 
Code an integral part of their contracts with personnel and subcontractors (the Code, section 
18). In addition, the Code should be incorporated into national regulatory regimes, such as 
licensing and monitoring schemes. 
 
If effectively and broadly implemented, the Code – although a form of soft law – may 
contribute both to preventing misconduct and to enhancing accountability. At the same time – 
with a hint of healthy scepticism – one must bear in mind that industry representatives 
(whichever industry it may be) generally are proponents of self-regulation, as a means to 
avoid further, more formal, regulation. Self-regulation is, in my view, not sufficient in the 
case of PSCs, but the Code is a positive and important complement to existing and possible 
future regulation. At any rate, states and other actors may capitalize on the good will shown 
by the PSC industry and its need for positive PR and good working relationships with 
potential clients, which includes governments, NGOs and international organisations. Being 
the result of a multi-stakeholder process (including industry representatives, governments, 
academics and NGOs), and considering its comparably detailed contents, the Code of conduct 
has probably a greater potential than many other industry codes of conduct. This is provided 
that the foreseen oversight and compliance mechanism is effectively put in place, however 
(see section 7 of the Code). 
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The Code is certainly an improvement compared to earlier proposals, which tended to focus 
on single issues, such as PSCs under certain types of contracts, a prohibition for PSCs to be 
involved in certain activities or reporting and monitoring systems. This Code includes all 
PSCs performing in so-called “complex environments” (a wider term than conflict and post-
conflict areas), not only PSCs hired by governments or other official entities. Moreover, the 
Code contains clear and industry specific principles of conduct, including provisions on the 
use of force and the management of apprehended or detained persons, general management 
and governance ”translated” from international human rights and international humanitarian 
law. The Code also contains specific provisions on remedies and meeting liabilities, and an 
obligation to appoint designated personnel to receive incident reports. The oversight and 
compliance mechanism – once in place – is also a positive measure, although its effectiveness 
remains to be seen. 
 
On the negative side, there is a risk that the Code’s grievance mechanism will prove 
insufficient, in that incident reporting focuses on reporting to the PSC’s client, rather than to 
state authorities (although reporting to competent authorities is proscribed to the extent 
required by law or “where appropriate”, see sections 63 and 67(a) of the Code). In cases 
involving more serious human rights abuses, the Code proscribes obligatory reporting also to 
competent authorities (see section 24 read together with section 22 of the Code). It is also 
worth noting that the Code does not explicitly deal with the status issue, i.e. that private 
security provider personnel normally have the status of civilians in situations of armed 
conflict. It might have been in place to spell this out, even though one may implicitly read it 
out from the provisions on the use of force and firearms, detention and apprehending persons 
(sections 30-34). Moreover, the sections on the selection and vetting of subcontractors are, in 
my view, too weak and lenient to ensure compliance with the Code. Finally, although the 
provisions on training of PSC staff are detailed enough and there are provisions on reporting 
procedures, I am missing a provision on the specific responsibilities of company 
management, as compared to other staff. 
 
At any rate, the overall effectiveness of the Code will certainly depend on the foreseen 
external oversight and compliance mechanism. In this context, it is important that any 
monitoring system does not rely on self-reporting, since such a system has inherent 
shortcomings. This being said, is perhaps the Code of conduct – together with the Montreaux 
Document – sufficiently regulating PSCs at the international level? In my view, it is not. The 
complexity of the legal issues surrounding PSC activities in conflict and post-conflict areas, 
as well as the seriousness of abuses involving PSCs, make self-regulation inadequate. In 
addition, by relying solely on self-regulation there is a risk that the law as it actually stands be 
undermined. At this point in time, however, this is probably the best one can hope for. 
 
Regulation is the easy part, while follow-up – including monitoring, the exercise of 
jurisdiction and other measures – obviously is extremely challenging in conflict and post-
conflict areas. Another basic problem is that the situation on the ground in these areas often is 
unpredictable. As a result, and irrespective of the existence of regulation, PSCs and their 
employees may find themselves in unforeseen and dangerous situations, resulting in irregular 
fighting on their part. This risk can be reduced through regulation, well-formulated contracts 
and proper training of PSC leadership and employees, but cannot be completely overcome. 
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5.2.2 The exercise of jurisdiction, accountability and 
reparations 
Chapter 4 above dealt with existing possibilities to hold states respectively PSCs and their 
employees accountable. From that, we can conclude that, in most cases, international law 
already contains regulation providing a basis for holding PSC management and employees, as 
well as states, accountable for grave violations of human rights and humanitarian law 
involving PSCs (regulatory gaps exist primarily when it comes to the prosecution of crimes 
other than grave breaches of international law). The main causes behind the current lack of 
accountability for crimes involving PSCs in conflict and post-conflict areas are of a 
jurisdictional / procedural, economic or practical nature, coupled with a lack of political will. 
This applies to both grave breaches of international law and lesser crimes. Gaps also exist 
when it comes to holding companies as entities accountable. We can thus conclude that 
although material regulation is necessary to reduce impunity, it is useless unless states also 
are able and willing to exercise jurisdiction, in particular criminal jurisdiction. I will now 
discuss in more depth some of the problems connected with the (lack of) exercise of 
jurisdiction. 
 
Most national legal systems have legislation in place, allowing national judicial authorities to 
prosecute persons who have violated international human rights and humanitarian law 
abroad, at least with regard to perpetrators who have a more or less strong connection with 
the state (notably the state’s own citizens). As a rule, states also exercise jurisdiction with 
regard to crimes with universal jurisdiction, i.e. the gravest international crimes. On the other 
hand, many states do not confer competence to their judicial authorities to prosecute other 
crimes committed abroad by a foreign citizen employed by a private firm established in the 
state (unless the citizen in some other way is legally established in the state). In fact, on many 
occasions states do not exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over crimes such as robbery, theft 
and less serious cases of assault, even where suspects are citizens. There is need for further 
discussion on how and by whom these crimes should be prosecuted. Enhanced cooperation 
between national legal authorities in contracting states, home states and host states is a key 
issue when it comes to reducing impunity for these crimes. In this connection, the difficulties 
connected with expanding the competence of national authorities, notably problems related to 
the compiling and evaluation of evidence, must be dealt with. In this connection, issues 
related to international relations and the principle of reciprocity in matters of jurisdiction 
need to be taken into account. 
 
Provided there is legislation in place allowing prosecution, one faces another problem, 
namely the practical difficulties related to the conduct of trials in the theatre of operations. 
Local courts may not be able to exercise jurisdiction, because immunity has been granted 
under a memorandum of understanding or because local, judicial authorities simply are not 
functioning properly. As a result, cases must be brought in courts in the PSC’s or the 
suspect’s home state. This often makes the conduct of proceedings very difficult and costly, 
since witnesses and other evidence, as a rule, are in the state where the conduct took place. It 
has been done, but it is less likely that states are willing to carry out similar trials on a regular 
basis. Under all circumstances, there are a number of arguments why criminal cases should 
be tried where the crime was committed, if practically feasible and provided that legal 
certainty and the human rights of the accused can be guaranteed.  
 
One possible solution in these situations is transportable courts able to conduct criminal and 
civil trials in (or in the proximity of) theatre. Where a PSC is deployed in an area where its 
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home state’s armed forces are present, such as US-based PSCs operating in Iraq a few years 
back, one idea is to extend that state’s jurisdiction to (certain specified) PSC activities. Thus, 
violations of humanitarian law and human rights could be dealt with immediately and on 
location. As mentioned earlier, the United Kingdom has a Standing Civilian Court, which is 
used with UK armed forces abroad
204
. As of today, however, that court has jurisdiction only 
over individuals employed directly by the United Kingdom government, excluding 
employees of UK based PSCs. This issue naturally needs further consideration and 
discussion, but there does not seem to be any reasons of principle against extending the 
jurisdiction of similar transportable courts. Where a home state’s army is present and able to 
exercise jurisdiction over its troops, the state might thus consider establishing a transportable 
civilian court, which uses the administrative, logistical and other resources of its military 
court (there are tenable arguments against trying civilians in military courts) or of other home 
state authorities present. In areas where the home state is not in a position to exercise 
jurisdiction – i.e. the majority of cases – this solution is not available, however. In those 
cases, other solutions must be found to make prosecution in the home state (or a third state) 
possible. 
 
The purpose of the controversial immunity clauses in contracts between PSCs and host 
governments, e.g. in Iraq, is to prevent PSC employees from being prosecuted in host state 
courts. However, there is no reason why these employees should be exempt from prosecution 
back in the PSC’s or the employee’s home state. Therefore, independently of the above 
measures, PSC licensing regimes should explicitly prescribe that immunity clauses in 
contracts between PSCs and host governments do not prevent prosecution of PSC employees 
or other legal measures under the jurisdiction of the licensing state. The same applies to 
licensing regimes regulating licenses awarded to private individuals, such as security guard 
licenses. Under all circumstances, immunity clauses should be the result of careful 
consideration and not routinely included in PSC contracts. 
 
As of today, it is not possible to hold companies or other entities criminally responsible under 
international law. There are, however, other legal means with tangible consequences for 
companies whose employees have committed crimes. As mentioned earlier, states may be 
obliged under human rights law to allow access to national courts for criminal and tort claims 
against PSCs and their employees. Thus, victims should be able to bring civil law suits in 
national courts not only against the perpetrator, but also against his or her employer, the PSC. 
However, there are gaps with regard to individual victims’ possibilities to obtain reparations 
from PSCs, making this method less effective than it should be. 
 
The above-mentioned judgements and decisions in United States federal courts of appeal, 
including cases concerning abuses at the Abu Ghraib detention centre in Iraq, show that the 
application of the ATCA in cases involving corporate defendants differ. Some courts have 
accepted corporations and private individuals as defendants in ATCA cases, others have 
found that corporations are proper defendants only when they were de facto state actors. Until 
the issue has been settled by the US Supreme Court, the legal situation remains unclear.  The 
entire issue of corporate liability under the ATCA is not yet settled following the case Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., which is expected to be decided by the US Supreme Court in 
autumn 2012.
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place. One possible solution is that a treaty, similar to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
206
, 
be concluded, requiring states to provide jurisdiction allowing civil law suits, including class 
actions, against commercial entities. Still, even where national legislation similar to the 
ATCA is applicable, obstacles of jurisdictional and practical nature often impair its 
application and need attention, as suggested earlier in this sub-chapter. 
 
The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is subsidiary to that of national 
courts and the number of ICC cases involving PSC employees are not likely to be many. Still, 
it is worth mentioning that the Statute of the Court provides for the possibility of a trust fund 
and empowers the Court to order that fines be transferred to the fund
207
. One idea is that 
PSCs, whose employees are convicted by the court, are at least encouraged to contribute to 
the fund, thus contributing to victims’ compensation in cases where the perpetrator is 
insolvent. 
 
Recent international regulatory initiatives, such as the above-mentioned Montreux Document 
and the UN Draft Convention on Private Military and Security Companies, contain 
provisions on the exercise of jurisdiction and on regulatory obligations of states. As I 
mentioned earlier, the Montreux Document is not a proactive document and is not, by itself, 
very helpful when it comes to improving the current deficiencies. The UN Draft Convention 
contains at least some more proactive provisions, which hopefully can inspire further 
measures, even though the Draft Convention itself is unlikely to enter into force in the near 
future. 
5.3 Conclusions, final reflections and a glance 
towards the future 
This thesis has demonstrated that although there are certain gaps in the international law 
regulating PSCs, there is no such thing as a vacuum of law. When discussing future 
regulation one must keep in mind that existing international law already governs the activities 
of PSCs in many respects. One must also be careful not to let discussions concerning 
regulation, in particular when revolving around (voluntary) codes of conduct and model 
regulations, undermine law as it actually stands. Still, this thesis has pointed out a number of 
areas in need of attention and has suggested certain legal measures, which would serve to 
prevent misconduct on the part of PSCs and to enhance accountability. 
 
As always where international or multinational actors are involved, national solutions alone 
are inadequate. First of all, internationally active PSCs are often organised in flexible 
structures, allowing them to avoid one national legal system by transferring their seat to 
another state, or by restructuring and moving their activities, re-establishing under another 
name and structure. Secondly, extraterritorial application of national norms that are not 
widely recognised internationally will meet with a number of legal and practical difficulties. 
For these reasons, legal loopholes in the control of the private security sector ideally should 
be closed at the regional and international levels. International organisations contracting 
PSCs should take the lead, in particular with regard to preventive and monitoring measures, 
but also when it comes to providing reparations to victims of abuse. At the same time, 
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existing human rights law, humanitarian law and criminal law need to be enforced. National 
laws related to PSC employees working abroad need to be adopted and enforced, in 
combination with elaborate licensing regimes, as suggested above. A first step would be to 
ensure such enforcement with regard to PSC employees working under government contracts 
or deployed by international organisations. 
 
The use of PSCs in conflict and post-conflict areas has meant an increase in the number of 
actors legitimately using force, a development with pros and cons. The basic problem is that 
the delegation of the use of force to private actors renders oversight and (democratic) control, 
as well as ensuring accountability, more difficult. This is the perhaps most central issue to 
deal with at present. 
 
It is probably unavoidable that conflict and post-conflict situations are complicated by the 
presence of more actors. Several actors also means demarcation issues, e.g. in cases of 
cooperation between PSCs and national armed forces. Experiences from e.g. Iraq and 
Afghanistan suggest that state military does not always has enough knowledge of and insight 
into PSCs tasks, organization and working conditions. It is important that political leaders 
and state military take into account the full consequences of contracting or otherwise 
cooperating with PSCs in conflict and post-conflict areas. In this connection, it is important to 
realize that the behaviour of (foreign) PSCs in a conflict-prone country easily spills over on 
any foreign armed forces present, affecting the view of the local population and leadership of 
the foreign presence as a whole. We have seen many examples of this in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. 
 
On the positive side, states, international organizations, NGOs and private actors may hire 
PSCs in order to be able to carry out work that would otherwise be impossible, due to lacking 
state capacity to ensure security. It is important to remember that PSC activities are not all 
about using force; PSCs perform a variety of tasks and one must analyze the specific 
problems or challenges in any given situation. One should also weigh the risks involved 
against the need to carry out certain tasks, which states lack the capacity to do. And, although 
it has happened, it seems unlikely that state military would favour any regular participation of 
PSCs in military operations or in handling intelligence, questioning prisoners, and similar 
tasks. It is more likely that state military would favour PSC tasks related to the protection of 
civilians, certain logistics etc. 
 
As for the future, the PSC industry is eagerly exploring new fields of engagement, including 
participation in international peace support operations. Now, PSCs are already contracted by 
the UN, regional organisations and aid agencies. At the same time, it is a founding principle 
of the UN Charter (article 2) that states, under UN authority, take responsibility for the 
maintenance of peace and security. To a certain extent, the use of PSCs in UN missions 
represents a break with this principle. It is a known problem that the UN and other entities 
within the international community regularly have difficulties finding states willing to deploy 
their armed forces for international tasks. At the same time, the private security industry 
expresses a keen interest in partaking in peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian 
relief operations. However, peace enforcement operations under the auspices of the UN 
Security Council are likely to involve combat, which means that PSC participation meets 
with a number of legal obstacles, as pointed out in the foregoing analysis. Under all 
circumstances, as when governments transfer tasks to private subjects, the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of private contributions to peace building depend on the multilateral 
institutions’ ability to manage the transfer of tasks and responsibilities to the contracted firms. 
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It can be questioned whether the UN and other multinational organisations, as of today, have 
the structures necessary to ensure high standards of conduct of PSCs. 
 
Opinions among commentators differ as to the likeliness that PSCs will be deployed for these 
kinds of tasks in the near future. Under all circumstances, the efforts to regulate PSCs must 
take into account the ambitions of the industry and try to lie ahead. In the present situation, 
especially considering the flexibility and mobility of many PSCs, regulation can only be 
effective if it is widely accepted within the international community. Considering the 
complex issues involved in the application of humanitarian law and human rights law in 
peace operations, and given the civilian status of most PSC employees, corporate 
peacekeeping operations are probably not a suitable solution in the near future. 
 
Up until today, individual states and the international community have failed, and continue to 
fail, to ensure physical security and meet the basic humanitarian needs of civilian populations 
in conflict and post-conflict situations in various parts of the world. By no means 
underplaying the serious challenges posed by the use of PSCs in conflict and post-conflict 
areas, I think that PSCs – ideally – might contribute with skills, innovative ideas and cost-
effective thinking in the said situations. By ensuring effective, regulatory control over the 
PSC industry and its activities, and provided that PSCs are deployed only at appropriate 
locations and for carefully selected, suitable tasks, the international community and other 
actors can significantly reduce the risks connected with the deployment of PSCs, while taking 
advantage of its possibilities. 
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